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Who Shall Decide When Doctors
Disagree? A Review of the Legal
Development of Informed Consent
and the Implications of Proposed
Lay Review of Human
Experimentation
MarianF. Ratnoff*
After surveying the historical development of informed consent,
the author considers the current effect of the doctrine upon various
categories of human experimentation. Against this background, the
author analyzes recent federal legislation and administrative regulations directed toward problems in experimentation, focusing in particular upon the hotly debated issue of the role of laymen in the
control of medical research.
Who shall decide, when Doctors disagree,
And soundest Casuists doubt, like you and me?'
I.

INTRODUCTION

CAME up from Alabama, to Washington one March
THEY
morning in 1973-two country people-to bear witness to some

2
unhappy events of their lives. They were poor; they were black.
Their audience was with a number of United States Senators investi-

gating the use of human subjects in medical experiments.

Their at-

torney testified that for 40 years they had been unknowing participants in a long-term study conducted by the United States Public
Health Service to determine the course of untreated syphilis.3

The

investigation, which started at a time when treatment with arsphena* B.A., University of Chicago, 1946; M.A., Western Reserve University,
1959; J.D., Western Reserve University School of Law, 1967. The author is a practicing lawyer in Cleveland, Ohio.
1. A. PoPE, EPISTLES TO SEVERAL PERSONS (MORAL ESSAYS) 114 (Epistle I) (I. Wellington ed., Univ. of Miami 1963).
2. Hearings on S. 974, S. 878, and S.J. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare (Quality of Health
Care-Human Experimentation, 1973), 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1036-42
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
3. Id. at 1033-35.
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mine or its cogeners was well established, was continued even when
a revolutionary therapy, the use of penicillin, became the standard
of care. 4 Ingenuously, these subjects of the so-called Tuskegee
Study told the story of their recruitment and participation. "[Tihey
said we had bad blood. After then they started giving us the shots
. . . for a good long time." 5 In fact, they received no antisyphilitic
treatment.6
Despite their chilling testimony, both witnesses seemed only
dimly aware of the extent of the deception that had been practiced
upon them. They did appreciate, however, that they had been used
in some manner,7 and, perhaps coached by their lawyer, they asked
that compensation be given them so they could, in their words,
"continue [their] health."8 The more sophisticated testimony of
their attorney chronicled a frightening misuse of individual human
experimental subjects 9 emanating from what must surely have been
the innocent intentions of the investigators to provide a greater good
to a greater number. Yet, the evidence reads like an evil scenario. 10
The subjects were enticed into and induced to remain in the study
by promises of free medicine, burial assistance, free meals, and automobile trips to and from the hospital followed by opportunities to
stop in town to visit friends."' Above all, they were never told they
had syphilis. They did not understand the meaning of the euphemism "bad blood," nor were they told they were part of a study. 1 2 No
one asked for their consent to remain untreated and none was given.
A subsequent investigation of the study uncovered an absence of a
written experimental protocol and a questionable statistical founda13
tion for a meaningful long-term study.
4. 10 VENEREAL DISEASE INFORMATION 53, 65-66 (1929), cited in G.
ANDRnws, DISEASES OF THE SKIN 507 (2d ed. 1938); J. STOKEs, H. BEERmAN
& N. INGRAHAM, JR., MODERN CLINICAL SYPHILOLOGY

ch.

7, at 210 (3d ed.

1944).
5. 1973 Hearingspt. 3, at 1036.
6. Id. at 1035.
7. Id. at 1041.
8. Id. The participants filed suit in the Middle District of Alabama
against various governmental agencies-federal and state-and certain doctors.
The suit sought a $3 million judgment. The case was settled, however, before
trial with an award of $37,500 to each survivor. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1975,
at 31, col. 8.
9. 1973 Hearingspt. 3, at 1033-36.
10. Id. at 1033.
11. Id. at 1034.
12. Id.
13. Curran, The Tuskegee Syphillis Study, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 730
(1973).
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Through the years, the men believed the injections they were
receiving were therapeutic. 14 During a campaign mounted in the
late forties and early fifties to provide penicillin to all persons in the
United States suffering from syphillis, they were specifically enjoined
by the study's sponsors from seeking treatment. 5 Thus, they were
denied the basic freedom to choose whether to continue or to seek
new help.
Could the Tuskegee experiment be conducted today? This
article will consider a number of similar instances of human experimentation and the philosophical responses and legislative safeguards
which are emerging as a result of their disclosure. Some examples
are drawn from the testimony adduced at the aforementioned Senate
Subcommittee hearings's on the quality of health care in this country
while many reach back into early case law.' 7 The cases and events
chronicled here, however, are notable as exceptions to the conscientious work of thousands of physicians in whose debt we lie.
Medical scientists, generally a self-critical group, recognized the
dilemmas posed by the need for human experimentation long before
the subject interested lawyers. However difficult the premise may
be to accept emotionally, accretion of medical knowledge cannot progress without human subjects. Indeed, as a result of human
experimentation, the state of the art of medicine changes with
such rapidity that today's standard of care becomes tomorrow's malpractice. Americans who are so quick to demand the panacea of
a simple injection to cure assorted aches and pains should be
cautioned against the adoption of self-righteous attitudes toward
physicians and human experimentation.
Appreciation of the complexities surrounding the use of human
beings as experimental subjects requires an examination of the
growth and development of modem medical science. Today, the organization and methodology of clinical investigation are taken for
granted, yet medical research involving large scale clinical trials is
a very recent development. Before the 1940's, organized hunts for
causes and cures of disease were very few.' 8 Medical knowledge
14.
15.
16.
17.

1973 Hearingspt. 3, at 1038.
Id. at 1034, 1042.
See id. passim.
See notes 33, 47-85 infra.

18. One notable exception at the turn of the century was Dr. Walter
Reed's search for the cause of yellow fever. Carefully controlled tests were
carried out in which heroic volunteers died. Dr. Reed was concerned that each
volunteer should be made aware of the risks and possible fatal consequences

of participation in the study. His work, done under the auspices of the United
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was advanced by a small number of investigators working in modest
university or hospital laboratories supported by the endowments of
the institutions, individual private benefactors, or grants from philanthropic foundations.' 9 Such simple arrangements for those lucky
enough to receive support were possible because of the comparatively
simple state of the art. None of the sophisticated equipment or
salary support which are integral to today's research was available
or even conceived of before World War II. Today's principal sources
of funds, the government and the drug houses, were not a part of
the investigatory process. 20 Government support for research was
confined to scattered laboratories of the Department of Agriculture
for crop research and of the United States Public Health Service for
intramural investigation. 2 ' Although the Public Health Service had
established the National Institutes of Health in 1937 and had begun
to make a few grants, 22 modern research and development began in
earnest only in 1941 with the outbreak of World War H. Franklin
D. Roosevelt provided the framework for an unheard-of collaboration between government and university by setting up the Office of
Scientific Research and Development, an organization born of the
war needs of the nation. 23 The Office had the task of determining
the military needs of the country, including the medical needs of the
States Army, is an example worthy of imitation. For further description of
this work, see Dowling, Human Experimentation in Infectious Disease, 198
J.A.M.A. 997 (1966). Y.LLow FEVER, A COMPILATION OF VARIous PUBLIcATIONS, S. Doc. No. 822, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. (1911), contains fascinating accounts by Drs. Reed, Carroll, and Agramonte, who worked at Camp Lazear
in Cuba. Dr. Reeds reports describe experimental attempts to establish the
fever in 16 individuals who gave "full consent." Id. ch. 5. Dr. Lazear, for
whom the camp was named, died after contracting yellow fever as a self-experimenter.
For an example of United States Army requirements on the use of soldier
volunteers, see Army Reg. No. 70-25 (Use of Volunteers as Subjects of Research) (1962).
19. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ScIENCES, FEDERAL SUPPORT OF BASIC RESEARCH IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING 22

(1964) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL SUPPORT]. By 1928, the foundations
were acknowledged to be the principal support for science. Id. Gray, Science
and Profits, HARPER'S MAcAZINE, Apr. 1936, cited in Fishbein, Medical Patients, 109 J.A.M.A. 1539, 1542 (1937), states: "Scientific research, as a recognized full-time occupation, is one of the youngest of the professions. It has
come up out of the basements and garrets of the early experimenters, and has
attained status among the most honored of the callings of man."
20. FEDERAL SUPPORT 22.
21. Id. at 17-18 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture), 40 (U.S. Public Health
Service).
22. Id. at 40.
23. Id. at 25.
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military, and of finding research laboratories at the universities and
in industries that could supply answers. Dealings between the Office
and the various laboratories with which it worked were reduced to
contracts that secured the services of the scientists in return for
government support.2 4 Provisions regarding costs, acquisition and
disposition of equipment and other property, patents, and security
were written into these contracts. 25 The pattern for support, therefore, was well established when the scientists, who had devoted their
talents to the military application of scientific knowledge were ready
to return to their universities following the end of the War.
It was the will of determined and farsighted men like James Forrestal and Vannevar Bush, who had helped to formulate the national
science policy during the War, that this government "partnership with
university scientists" should persist.2 6 With their support and that
of certain congressmen,2 7 an explosion of medical research occurred.
Age-old plagues of mankind were attacked, and in many cases
conquered, with a vigor and enthusiasm that the large sums of avail28
able money enhanced.
When the Public Health Service established the prestigious
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Clinical Center in 1953,29 the
partnership of the government and clinical medicine begun in the war
years was cemented. The Clinical Center provided a new kind of
organization for the study of disease. Many of the monumental
strides and perceptions which marked the postwar medical research
in the United States may be attributed to .the Center.
Now, as then, people who come to the Center for study and treatment are those whose doctors have exhausted their knowledge and
ability to help. Because of the unlimited resources, the many
scientific disciplines represented, the pool of exceptional talent, and
the superspecialization of NIH physicians, dramatically innovative
therapy can be attempted there, sometimes with remarkable results.
For many, the Center is the last refuge. For others, healthy people
24. Id. at 27.

25. Id.
26. Id. at 35.
27. Id. at 31-32.
28. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1354,
1355 (1966).
29. Frankel, The Public Health Service Guidelines Governing Research Involving Human Subjects: An Analysis of the Policy-Making Process, in PROGRAM OF POLICY STUDIES IN SCmNCE AND TECHNOLOGY 9 (George Washington
Univ. Monograph No. 10, 1972).

WHO SHALL DECIDE?

1975]

who come as normal volunteers, 30 the Center provides an opportunity
31
to fulfill religious, moral, or civic duties.
II.

HISTORICAL REVIEW

This blossoming of medical knowledge following World War 'II
was not unflawed. The ethical and legal problems raised by the
existence of a facility like the NIH and, indeed, by the absolute need
for human experimentation had troubled doctors for many years.
Only in the last two decades have nonscientists as well become
32
aware of the problems.
A.

United States v. Karl Brandt

Perhaps the first glimmer of information about the problems of
human experimentation came to nonscientists from an unusual
source, the Nazi war crimes trials. No discussion of the legal and
proper involvement of the human experimental subject should
proceed without reflecting upon the demonic behavior documented
in United States v. Karl Brandt,33 the Medical Case heard by the
Nuremburg tribunal following World War I. In his opening statement at .trial, Brigadier-General Telford Taylor observed that the 23
Nazi doctor-defendants had received human subjects in wholesale
lots---"200 Jews . . ., 50 gypsies, 500 tubercular Poles, or 1,000
Russians" 34 -for diabolical experiments which "revealed nothing
which civilized medicine can use."' 35 A sampling of such experiments is a catalogue for death. Injections of live typhus virus merely
to maintain the strain, intravenous injections of gasoline to determine
30. NATIONAL INsTrruTEs OF HEALTH CLmICAL CENTER, HANDBOOK ON
Normal volunteers are defined as persons possessing no demonstrable scientific contraindicatory abnormalities.
31. Id. at 3. "Current Sources of Volunteers" lists religious groups, college students, and civic groups that provide normal volunteers for the Center.
32. Two of the earliest discussions of the conflict raised by experimental
THE NORMAL VOLUNTEER PATIENT PROGRAM iV (rev. ed. 1966).

medicine are Cady, Medical Malpractice: What About Experimentation?, 6 ANNALS OF W. MED. & SURGERY 164 (1952), and Ladimer, Ethical and Legal As-

pects of Medical Research on Human Beings, 3 J. PuB. L. 467 (1954). Ladimer, an attorney, has done much of the fundamental work, gathering much
of the source material upon which others have built. The basic text on the
subject of human experimentation was CLINICAL INVESTIGATION IN MEDICINE:
LEGAL, ETICAL ANm MORAL ASPECTS (I. Ladimer & R. Newman eds. 1963).
33. 1, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
(The Medical Case) (Military Tribunal I, 1947).
34. 1 id. at 27.
35. Id. at 73.
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how fast they would cause death, and forced ingestion of sea water
to determine how long the subjects could survive, typify the experiments performed supposedly in the name of science. 36
B. The Codes
Brandt, an unusual and dramatic case, marked the beginning of
modem formal guidance for the medical researcher. The opinion
set out 10 principles for conducting human experiments that became
known as the Nuremberg Code. 37 The Code may now appear some36. Id. at 46 (sea water), 50 (typhus), 73 (gasoline injections).
37. See Ladimer, Human Experimentation: Medicolegal Aspects, 257
NEw ENG. J. MED. 18, 22 (1957); Welt, Reflections on the Problems of Human Experimentation, 25 CONN. MFw. 75, 76 (1961). The Nuremberg Code
states:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential ....

2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of
study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results
of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori
reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental
physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be
solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote
possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should
be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached
the physical or mental state where continuation of the experment seems to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must
be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has
probably [sic] cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith,
superior skill and careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability,
or death to the experimental subject.
United States v. Brandt, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (The Medical Case) 181-82 (Military Tribunal I, 1947).
Brigadier General Taylor, Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials, states
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what diffuse, but it remains basically sound. To this author's
knowledge, it is the first expression of the absolute requirement of
consent to nontherapeutic experimentation. Continued refinement
of the Nuremberg precepts climaxed in the widely supported Declaration of Helsinki in 1964,38 a document issued by the World
Medical Association and adopted by many learned societies. 39 In
essence, the Declaration of Helsinki requires an adequate experimental design, adequately trained medical personnel, the fully informed
consent of the subject, and a risk not disproportionate to the
knowledge to be gained. 40 More sophisticated than the Nuremberg
Code, the Declaration recognizes the difference between a therapeutic experiment, in which clinical research is combined with professional care, and nontherapeutic clinical research, in which experiments are not expected to benefit the subject but are designed to
41
add to the understanding of normal and disease states.
In 1966, the American Medical Association (AMA) adopted
42
ethical guidelines for research which expanded the Helsinki work.
The AMA Guidelines and the Helsinki Declaration, both more
detailed than the Nuremberg Code, require that definitive animal
experimentation precede human experimentation and that the benefit to be derived be proportionate -to the risk taken. The crux of
both codes is concern with the subject's informed consent: Does the
subject understand what is being done to him, what risks he faces,
that the Code was formulated by two American judges with the assistance of
Dr. Andrew Ivy, a prominent medical investigator. See Informed Consent in
Drug Research, 3 COLum. J.L. & Soc. PROB., Oct. 24, 1966, at S-4, S-7 n.105.

Dr. Leo Alexander wrote the critical memorandum to the war crimes court
on human experimentation. Alexander, Psychiatry: Methods and Processes
for Investigation of Drugs, 169 ANs.ALs op N.Y. ACAD. ScI. 344, 345 (1970).
In England there were expressions of ethical guidelines for physicians as
early as 1803. In 1848, the American Medical Association issued a Code of
Medical Ethics based on the 1803 document. Cf. Kidd, The Problem of Experimentation on Human Beings: Limits of the Right of a Person to Consent
to Experimentation on Himself, 117 ScmNcB 211, 212 (1953). These guides,
of course, did not address the problem of medical research as we know it today.
38. Edelson, Human Guinea Pigs: A Curb, World Journal Tribune, Sept.
25, 1966, at 34, col. 4.
39. The Changing Mores of Biomedical Research: A Colloquium on Ethical Dilemmas from Medical Advances, 67 ANNALs OF INTERNAL MED. supp.

7, app. IV, at 75 (1967).
40. Editorial, The Experimental Use of Human Beings, 65 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 371, 372 (1966).
41. Lowe, Pediatrics: Proper Utilization of Children as Research Subjects, 169 ANNA s OF N.Y. AcAD. Scl. 337, 339 (1970). A delineation of the
varieties of medical experiments appears in the text preceding note 45 infra.
42. ChangingMores, supranote 39, at 76.

480

CASE WESTERNO

RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:472

and what benefit may be derived from his participation or even his
sacrifice?
Unfortunately, these guidelines are flawed by the assumption that
human beings in stressful situations can grasp the investigators'
explanations. The codes are difficult to challenge because fully
informed consent, like Plato's ideal of beauty, is unattainable. They
condemn uninformed consent, but contain no blueprints for avoiding
it. A 10-year experience with the codes has proven, sadly, that they
are sometimes more honored by lip service than by fealty because
of their imprecision.
C. The Evolution of the Legal Doctrineof Informed Consent
1. Three Types of Medical Experiments
If the codes have provided unsatisfactory guidance, legal principles have been equally inadequate. Old legal doctrines yield with
the greatest reluctance or not at all to fit present day medical
research. To understand the difficulty of trying to adapt legal
precepts to clinical research, three types of modem medical experiments must be distinguished. First is the individual therapeutic
experiment that occurs in the treatment of a critically ill person
because, in his physician's judgment, he is not responding to the
standard or prescribed treatment for his disease or because the
physician feels the standard care is inadequate or hazardous in some
way. Frequently, such experimentation involves a patient suffering
a fatal disease to whom an untried or even potentially dangerous
drug is administered as a last resort. Here the effect of the drug
may be dramatically lifesaving or of no value at all. In either case
the experiment may advance the state of medical knowledge without
further jeopardizing the patient's life. These experiments often take
place on an individual basis and in isolated instances. Here, doctor
and patient are in their traditional relationship involving the patient's
faith and the physician's fiduciary duty.
A second type of experiment involves the less critically ill patient
to whom new or revised therapy is administered or, conversely, withheld -for the purpose of establishing a control. The Tuskegee experiment 43 is an example of the latter endeavor. This second category
of experiment may find the patient in his dependent role, but
frequently the doctor administering the treatment may be unknown
to him; the emphasis is upon the disease rather than the patient.
43. See text accompanying notes 2-13 supra.
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The investigator in this situation is interested in the mechanism of
44
disease and therapy; his goal lies beyond the individual.
The third type of experiment is purely manipulative. Subjects
of these experiments may be healthy, mentally and physically,
or they may be patients whose illnesses are under study
to elucidate their disease state. Here, drug administration or manipulation of normal or diseased bodily functions may be undertaken
to delineate the subject's physiological reactions, e.g., the body's
defenses or immune reactions. Manipulative experiments need not
be medically oriented. College students have been frequent subjects
of experiments involving dangerous alteration of their psychological
and sociological environment to record their reactions. 4 5
2. The Doctrineof Slater v. Baker
The concept of informed consent has application to all three
forms of experimentation since consent is a prerequisite to any act
involving risk to a patient or subject except in certain emergencies.
The quantity of the information that the doctor must provide, however, may vary according to the particular facts. For instance, if the
traditional doctor-patient relationship exists and the treatment elected
is a standard, well-established procedure involving risks which are
minimal in most patients, the doctor may not have to impart as much
information as he does when the risks are known to be greater. But
the more the elements of a situation diverge from the routine, the
more complete must be the patient's knowledge and understanding.
In the courts the doctrine of informed consent has come to
embody three major elements: (1) competence of the subject, (2)
his knowledge of the risk involved, and (3) voluntariness of the consent. 46 A historical review of familiar cases is essential to show the
evolution of these concepts. Some of the cases involve innovative
or experimental procedures conducted without informed consent;
others involve standard procedures posing risks of which the patients
are not informed. These cases are the only legacy which can
be applied, by analogy, to the nontherapeutic experimental setting.
44. For a good description of this type of experimentation see Medical
Experimentationon Human Beings, 152 SciBNcE 448 (1966).
45. For excerpts of published reports of such experiments with students

see Ring, Wallston & Corey, Disclosure of Manipulation, in

EXPERMENTATION

wrri HuM.AN BEiNGs 395 (J. Katz ed. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as
Katz].
46. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063,
2064 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich. 1973).
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Slater v. Baker41 appears accepted universally as the earliest
expression in our legal system of the need for consent to radically
new medical treatment. The case involved the unauthorized use of
an instrument of the surgeon's own design, one not used by other
surgeons. The court opined that to act contrary to the common
practice of surgeons was ignorance and "what no surgeon ought to
have done." 48 The court said that a patient should be informed of
any treatment he undergoes and that such a requirement is part of
"the usage and law of surgeons. ....49 In Slater all three elements
of consent were lacking. The decision, however, was more than a
condemnation of this shortcoming. The court indicated that the
defendants, in wishing to try an experiment, had committed a "rash
action." 50
During the ensuing century, case law developed no further than
the Slater doctrine. We hear Slater echoed in Carpenter v. Blake,51
a malpractice suit in which the court acknowledged the need to try
new methods where the disease was newly discovered 'Or the mode
of treatment unsettled. Yet the court held that "when the case
is one as to which a system of treatment has been followed for a
long time, there should be no departure from it, unless the surgeon
who does it is prepared to take the risk of establishing, by his success,
the propriety and safety of his experiment." 52 An opening wedge
in permitting experimentation can be discerned about thirty years
later in an interesting case, Allen v. Voe,53 which still held that a
physician generally could not experiment. Nevertheless, the court
stated that there might be an exception to the rule prohibiting experi54
mentation if the patient is in extremis.
47. 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767). Stapleton, an apothecary, was called
in by Slater, the plaintiff, to remove the bandages from his broken leg, which
had been set weeks before and which was apparently healing properly. Stapleton insisted upon calling in Baker, a surgeon. Baker then sent for a toothed
claw device of his own design, which he subsequently used on plaintiff without
consulting him. The King's Bench took evidence indicating that this procedure
varied radically from accepted medical procedure.
48. Id. at 862.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 863.
51. 60 Barb. 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other grounds, 50 N.Y.
696 (1872).
52. Id. at 524.
53. 114 Wis. 1, 89 N.W. 924 (1902).
54. "[A] physician of standing and loyalty to his patients will [not] subject them to mere experimentation, the safety or virtue of which has not been
established . . . save possibly when the patient is in extremis and fatal results
substantially certain unless the experiment may succeed." Id. at 22-23, 89
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3. The Early Approach to Experimentation:
Malpracticeand Battery
Development of the doctrine of informed consent inched on
through the 20th century.", Many of the cases in this slowly evolving body of law found the patient in a situation in which innovative
therapy was undertaken for his benefit. These cases sounded in
negligence, and occasionally in battery, and frequently penalized the
doctor for straying too far from the standard of practice even though
it might have been inadequate for the patient. Although consent
was recognized as a major issue in these cases, the courts found that
the mere presence of some form of consent was not enough. Even
though the doctors' actions in these cases were taken to benefit the
patient, the doctor had not provided the information that the
hazardous nature of the procedure required or had exceeded the procedures actually consented to. Negligence forms the basis of an action in malpractice. The standard of care applied in malpractice
cases is founded upon the law's regard for the physician as an
individual of superior knowledge and skill. In Prosser's view, the
law demands of him conduct consistent with his knowledge, which
is greater than an ordinary man's.5"
In therapeutic experiments, the distinction between malpractice
and battery should be recognized. In a malpractice action, the plaintiff is alleging that he consented to the services rendered but that
the doctor performed negligently, i.e., he failed to adhere to the
appropriate standard of care. In a case of battery, the plaintiff alleges that he did not consent to the treatment or that the treatment
exceeded his consent.5 7 The theory of such cases is that an
N.W. at 932.
Neither Carpenternor Allen actually mentions the issue of patient consent.
But in Carpenter,by implication, consent to experimental procedures where an
accepted mode existed would not excuse the physician. Allen is viewed as relaxing the harsh rule because an experiment may be permissible on a patient
certain to die unless the experiment works. In such a case the patient may
be presumed to consent to a procedure that represents his only chance at life.

This is the first indication that a departure from accepted norms may be contemplated with the "consent" of the patient. See generally Katz 527-28.
55. E.g., Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936); Salgo v. Le-

land Stanford Junior Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d
170 (1957); Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); Schloendorff
v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (dictum), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
56. See W. PROSSER, HANDBoOK oF T LAw oF TORTS 161-66 (4th ed.

1971).
57. See, e.g., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 432-34, 88

484

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:472

unconsented-to touching of the patient by the physician has occur58
red.
The concept of informed consent as it developed in malpractice
cases would seem to apply by analogy to experimentation. The
analogy is made more difficult however because many of the early
20th century American cases spoke of negligence when, far from possessing superior skill, the ministering individual possessed no skill at
all. Frequently, the plaintiffs were victims of outright quackery. In
Graham v. Dr. Pratt Institute,59 for example, the plaintiff responded
to an advertisement for the removal of smallpox scars. Finding the
disastrous treatment not sanctioned by medical science, the court
ruled that no legal right had existed to perform the operation.
Malicious intent was absent, but the defendant would not be relieved
of the imputation of malice even in the presence of consent for
experimentation that ran beyond the bounds of "normal science." 60
In California, a child suffered irreparable harm when her physician,
employing a diagnostic machine of his own invention, misdiagnosed
her illness. Although her parents had agreed at first to the use of
the machine, they later withdrew their consent. In spite of the
original agreement, the court found against the doctor.8 1
Some courts did not rely on negligence but rather made findings
of battery when the physicians' acts exceeded what the patients
agreed to expressly. Rolater v. Strain,6 2 for example, held against the
doctor who removed a toe bone when the patient gave permission
for an operation on her toe but expressly forbade the removal of
bone. A Canadian court similarly confirmed a finding of battery
N.W.2d 186, 189-90 (1958); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12
(1905), overruled on other grounds, Genzel v. Halvarson, 248 Minn. 534, 80
N.W.2d 527 (1957).
58. See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1961). Battery is a form
of action anchored in the antiquity of English law, protecting the integrity of
one's physical being.
59. 163 Ill.
App. 91 (1911).

60. Id. at 93.
61. Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679, 8 P.2d 109 (1932).
In both Graham and Kershaw the "innovation" patently involved quackery
that took unfair advantage of the untrained and unsuspecting public.

Judge

and jury probably felt that some compensation was called for despite the fact
of consent. In those cases such a result was probably justified. But application of the harsh result to modem-day physicians, who in good faith and with
excellent training behind them engage in experimentation, may be stultifying
to medical progress. The mere fact that a procedure departs from the accepted
mode should not be a basis of liability when the patient has consented.
62. 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913).
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when the doctor, acting in an emergency, failed to give a complete
explanation of what he intended to do. The court said he had
exceeded the consent he received to perform certain acts.6 3 No
American cases appear to have so penalized the physician who acted
inan emergency.
By 1935, the concept that some experimentation must occur
began to be expressed. In Michigan, a jurisdiction distinguished by
its enlightened medicolegal opinions, Fortner v. Koch 64 acknowledged in dictum that the progress of medicine might be dependent
upon a "certain amount of experimentation,"6 but experimentation,
cautioned .the court, could not vary too radically from accepted procedures and could be undertaken only with the knowledge and
consent of the patient. 6
4. Evolution of Risk as an Element of Informed Consent
How much knowledge should be imparted to the patient remained undefined until Natanson v. Kline,6 7 a malpractice suit
against a hospital and its radiologist -for plaintiff's injuries resulting
from cobalt radiation therapy. On the patient's first visit, the
defendant doctor told her how long the treatments would take and
which areas of her body would be irradiated. That day, he began
63. Mulloy v. Hop Sang, 1 W.W.R. 714 (Alta. App. Div. 1935).
erally Gill v. Selling, 125 Ore. 587, 267 P. 812 (1928).

See gen-

The patient in Mulloy, a Chinese, specifically told the doctor not to amputate his hand because he wanted to consult his own physician. The doctor
indicated he would be governed by the conditions as he found them after ex-

amination under anesthesia. The patient was silent, a response that the doctor took as consent. Taking these circumstances in conjunction with the fact
that the patient did not speak English well, the court found a lack of consent

despite the apparent emergency.
In neither Rolater nor Mulloy
is the basis for liability. But the
Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W.
sented to surgery on her right ear.

does the court expressly state that battery
facts are comparable to those in Mohr v.
12 (1905). In Mohr the plaintiff had conDuring the operation the doctor discovered

that the left ear was also diseased and immediately proceeded successfully to
operate on it, although no emergency existed. The court found that by exceed-

ing the consent given, the doctor had committed a technical assault and battery.
64. 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
65. Id. at 282, 261 N.W. at 765.

66. Id.
67. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), rehearingdenied, 187 Kan. 186,

354 P.2d 670 (1960). The first Natanson case contains an excellent discussion of the difference between battery and malpractice, an issue raised in the
pleadings and briefs. Id. at 402, 350 P.2d at 1100. The court stated the for-

mer is intentional, the latter unintentional.
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therapy, 68 but failed to tell her that the risks of cobalt radiation included the injury she eventually sustained. 69 Directly facing the issue whether informed consent is possible when the nature of the risks
of treatment is not properly explained, the court asked:
What is the extent of a physician's duty to confide in his
patient where the physician suggests or recommends a particular method of treatment? What duty is there upon him
to explain the nature and probable consequences of that
treatment to the patient? To what extent should he disclose
the existence and nature of the risks inherent in the treatment?70
The case was sent back for retrial with instructions to the lower court
that the first issue for jury determination was whether the treatment
had been given with Mrs. Natanson's informed consent and that if
this question were answered negatively, a finding of malpractice must
issue. In denying Tehearing to the defendant, 71 the court explained
that a physician violates his duty and subjects himself to liability for
malpractice when no immediate emergency exists and he fails to
make reasonable disclosure of the risks involved. 72 Unfortunately,
the court's circular definition of "reasonable" as what a reasonable
medical practitioner would do under similar circumstances73 does not
provide the practitioner with clear guidelines. The court did
acknowledge, however, that under some circumstances the physician
may be justified in withholding disclosure.7 4 Mitchell v. Robinson,75
decided within two days of Natanson, also held that a physician has

a duty to inform his patient of the risk involved in treatment. 76
68. Id. at 401, 350 P.2d at 1100.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 403, 350 P.2d at 1101.
71. 187 Kan. 187, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
72. Id. at 188, 354 P.2d at 672.
73. Id. at 191, 354 P.2d at 673.
74. Id.
75. 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
76. Some courts have gone beyond the nebulous formulation in Natanson
and have attempted to refocus the scope of information that must be given to
the patient. Instead of considering what other practitioners might do, these
courts consider what information is actually essential to the patient in order
for him to make a rational judgment. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), held that the doctor must

impart all the information needed to make a decision if some of the information might lead the patient to refuse the treatment. See also Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969); Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C.
153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964).

19751

WHO SHALL DECIDE?

D. Consent to the NontherapeuticExperiment:
The Hyman Case
Not until 1965, when medical societies and thoughtful investigators were already wrestling with the problem, was the legal issue of
informed consent raised in a nontherapeutic experimental situation.
Interestingly, Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospita7 7 sounded
neither in battery nor negligence; indeed, the latter was considered
only obliquely in relation to a hospital trustee's duty. The basic
question was the right of a hospital director in performing his legal
duties to examine a patient's Tecord. 78 Hyman, a hospital trustee,
had been informed by several concerned physicians that a number
of patients at the chronic disease hospital had received injections of
live cancer cells to determine whether debilitated individuals could
reject cancer cells as readily as healthy persons. 7 9 The study was
part of an extensive investigation by a prestigious physician, a leading
authority on cancer and the body's defenses against the disease.80
Hyman wished to examine certain patients' records to determine
whether they had received injections of live cancer cells without their
knowledge or at best without their appreciation of the implication
of the procedure to which they were subjected. 8 ' The trial court upheld the director's right to inspect corporate Tecords, 82 but the
appeals court reversed, denying that right to Hyman because, it
argued among other things, the patient-physician privilege would be
violated. 83 The Appellate Division noted that the doctors had
attempted to justify their actions on the ground that a complete
explanation would have stirred up unnecessary anxieties. 84 New
York's highest court overturned the Appellate ,Division decision and
held that as a matter of law the director of a hospital corporation
is entitled to inspect records of the hospital to investigate alleged illegal and improper experimentation. It was suggested that confidentiality could be protected by withholding patients' names.8 5
77. 42 Misc. 2d 427, 248 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 21 App. Div.
2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258
N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
78. 42 Misc. 2d at 428, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
79. 21 App. Div. 2d at 497, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
80. Id.; Langer, Human Experimentation: New York Verdict Affirms
Patient'sRights, 151 ScmENCE 663 (1966).
81. 21 App. Div. 2d at 496, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 820.

82. 42 Misc. 2d at 429, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
83.

21 App. Div. 2d at 499, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 822.

84. Id. at 497, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
85. 15 N.Y.2d at 322, 206 N.E.2d at 339, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (1965).
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Hyman did not end with the New York Court of Appeals' decision. Applications for the revocation of the licenses of the two
physicians involved were filed before the New York Board of
Regents. 6 Addressing the problem of consent head-on, the Regents
found the physicians guilty of fraud and deceit, suspended their
licenses, but stayed execution, thus placing the doctors on probation
but allowing them to practice. 87 The Regents' opinion was not
shared by all. Shortly following his suspension, one of the physicians
was elected president of -the American Association for Cancer Research.88
Thus, controversy swirled around Hyman. Researchers, Regents, reporters, legal scholars, ethicians-all had opinions about the
case.8 9 No legal guidance for the modem clinical investigator could
be found in the meager legacy of negligence and battery which preHyman cases had brought to the 20th century, but the court did not
address the precise issue for which an answer was urgently required
by the medical community. If it had, the subsequent developments
and today's rancorous outcries from nouphysicians might never have
occurred.
E. The Treatment of Special Subjects
The ethical issues in the Hyman case seem simple in comparison
to the complexities of dealing with and trying to help certain other
experimental subjects who are even less able to participate in the
decisions affecting them than the Hyman subjects. In the case of
these special subjects, the elements of competence and voluntariness
are at issue, and frequently actual consent is absent also. 90 Nowhere
does the problem of informed consent elude solution more than with
those who suffer some legal disability. The child, the prisoner, the
86. Board of Regents of Univ. of St. of N.Y., Licenses Suspended, Suspensions Stayed, Respondents Placed on Probation, 34 J. MEETING OF BOARD OF
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF ST. OF N.Y. 787 (1965).
See also Katz 44-65, for
materials related to the Board of Regents' action.
87. Board of Regents, supra note 86, at 787.
88. 10 PROCEEDINGS OF Am. Ass'N FOR CANCER RESEARCH 110-11 (1969),
reprinted in Katz 65; Goodman, Doctors Must Experiment on Humans: But
What Are the Patient's Rights, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at
12, 33.
89. E.g., Langer, Human Experimentation: Cancer Studies at Sloan-Kettering Stir Public Debate on Medical Ethics, 143 SCIENCE 551 (1964); Lear,
Do We Need Rules for Experiments on People?, SATURDAY REVIEw, Feb. 5,
1966, at 61; Board of Regents, supra note 86, at 787.
90. Cf. Behrman, The Importance of Fetal Research, N.Y. Times, June 9,

1974, § 4, at 17, col. 2.
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mental retardate, and the mentally ill have been frequent participants in medical research. 9 1
1. Children
The defenselessness of children-their inability to consent, their
inability to comprehend procedures which they may undergo, and
their lack of experience-makes their plight difficult to resolve. In
addition, a problem exists about parents' competence to consent to
their children's participation in experiments not for their direct
benefit. In some nonbenefit experiments, an eminent pediatrician
questions the practicality of securing consent from the parents
alone. He suggests in these difficult circumstances a surrogate, e.g.,
a court, should participate and be the final arbiter in the decision. 9 2
In the end, no satisfactory resolution may be possible since obvious
and valid medical reasons necessitate work with children. They are
not miniature adults to whom the results of adult experimentation
can be applied in small doses. Unfortunately, the medical literature
does contain accounts of procedures of dubious value and questionable risks to which children have been subjected in the past.93
One poignant example of work with children in which medical
and lay opinion is divided by bitterness and accusations is the study
of viral hepatitis begun in 1956 among juvenile mental retardates
at New York's Willowbrook State School. 94 The crowding and
unsanitary conditions, which are a fact of the institutionalization of
retardates, and their sad inability to maintain personal hygiene, make
fecally borne infectious hepatitis rage through custodial institutions. 95
91. The classic article documenting earlier abuses is Beecher, Ethics and
Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966).
92. Telephone Interview with Dr. Frederick Robbins, Dean of the Case
Western Reserve University School of Medicine, Cleveland, Ohio, in Cleveland, Feb. 13, 1975. Dr. Robbins, a pediatrician, won the Nobel Prize for his
work on poliomyelitis research.
93. See Katz 958-64 for examples of abuses in pediatric research.
94. Krugman, Ward, Giles & Jacobs, Infectious Hepatitis: Studies on the
Effect of Gamma Globulin and on the Incidence of Inapparent Infection, 174

J.A.M.A. 823 (1960).

For a brief insight into medical opposition and Dr.

Krugman's work see Gillmor, Wrestling With Ethical Dilemmas: How Much

for the Patient,How Much for Medical Science? An Interview with Dr. Saul
Krugman, MODERN MED., Jan. 7, 1974, at 30, 33. Gillmor describes the attack
against Dr. Krugman by the Medical Committee for Human Rights. The
Medical Committee for Human Rights was established by physicians interested
in patients' rights. It now includes attorneys, engineers, and other members
who are nonphysicians. Personal communication to the author from Virginia
Snodgrass Cowart, Associate Editor, Medical News, J.A.M.A., Nov. 1, 1973.
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Hepatitis is frequently protracted and debilitating and sometimes
fatal to the victim. 96 Children entering Willowbrook had for a
number of years been exposed deliberately to the virus through
97
inoculation with infected serum or ingestion of infected material.
Doctors involved in the long term study believe and have argued
forcefully that the risk of being intentionally inoculated, with the
hope of establishing a mild, attenuated form of the disease, 98 is less
of a risk than that of living uninoculated under the prevailing insti-

tutional conditions.99
Critics of the Willowbrook experiments are many.:Lo

Many

parents alleged that they feared their children would be denied

10 1
admission if they refused consent to participation in the study.
Among physicians, controversy festers.' 0 2 Many believe the value

of the not inconsiderable knowledge gained from the experiment is
negated by the means by which it was attained. One esteemed

physician, lamenting the ineffectiveness of the codes, pointed out that
95. Krugman, Giles & Hammond, Infectious Hepatitis: Evidence for Two
Distinctive Clinical Epidemiological and Immunological Types of Infection,
200 J.A.M.A. 365 (1967).
96. Mosley & Galambos, Viral Hepatitis, in DISEASES oF THE LivER, 410,
456-61 (3d ed. Schiff 1969). Dr. Krugman believes hepatitis is not as debilitating in children as in adults. See GilImor, supra note 94, at 30.
97. Krugman, Ward, Giles, Bodansky & Jacobs, Infectious Hepatitis: Detection of Virus During the Incubation Period and in Clinically Inapparent Infection, 261 NEW ENG. J. MED. 729, 731 (1959) (innoculation with infected
serum); Ward, Krugman, Giles, Jacobs & Bodansky, Infectious Hepatitis:
Studies of its Natural History and Prevention, 258 NEW ENG. J. M D. 402,
412-14 (1958) (ingestion of infected material).
98. Smadel, Smallpox and Vaccinia, in VnuiL AND RicKErsAL INFECIONS
oF MAN 314, 323-32 (T. Rivers ed. 1948).
99. Krugman, Ward, Giles, Bodansky & Jacobs, Infectious Hepatitis: Detection of Virus During the Incubation Period and in Clinically Inapparent
Infection, 261 NEw ENG. J. MED. 729, 730 (1959) (innoculation with infected
serum); Krugman & Giles, Viral Hepatitis,New Light on an Old Disease, 212
J.A.M.A. 1019 (1970).
100. See, e.g., Beecher, supra note 91; Ingelfinger, Ethics of Experiments
on Children, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 791 (1973).
Dr. Krugman had also tested measles vaccine in its experimental development. In a recent interview with Dr. Krugman it was observed, "By no coincidence, critics of the ethical standards for his Willowbrook hepatitis investigation never seem to find fault with his measles studies." Gillmor, supra note
94, at 33.
101. Hearings on S. 974, S. 878, and S.J. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm.
on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare (Study of
Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation, 1973), 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 179 [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings] (remarks of Senator Hubert
H. Humphrey in offering S. 974, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)).
102. See, e.g., Ingelfinger, supra note 100.
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the Nuremberg Code, which had been -formulated by the time the
Willowbrook experiment began, interdicted this very use of the
patient who could not consent.10 3 Yet neither -adherence to the
Nuremberg Code nor the Helsinki Declaration could ever protect
children specifically because informed consent by definition excludes
them. So, arguably, informed consent is not the issue at Willowbrook.
Even with regard to normal children, who do not suffer the mental impairment of the Willowbrook inmates, consent remains a most
difficult problem. In the physician-patient context Prosser commented that those below the age of 21 are generally considered incapable of consenting to medical procedures.10 4 Current statutory
revisions in many states have lowered this age to 18.105 A 1941
case, Bonner v. Moran,10 6 is generally cited as the leading case
embodying the concept that a physician's duty to protect his patient
overrides a consent freely given by one of tender years. Fifteenyear-old Bonner was persuaded by his aunt to become a skin graft
donor for her badly burned child. The urgency and appeal of the
situation are easily imagined. Without his mother's knowledge,
young Bonner agreed to be the donor. Unfortunately, through his
participation on the experiment, the young boy himself suffered injury and was forced to spend two months in the hospital. The trial
court found for the defendant, but the appellate court remanded because the jury had not been instructed that parental consent was re103. Id.
104. W. PRossas, HANDBOOK oF Tm LAw OF TORTS 102-03 (4th ed. 1971).
105. See, e.g., Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3109.01 (Page Supp. 1974); see
Pohlman, Developments in the Law: The Physician and the Minor Patient,
70 Onto ST. MED. J. 41 (1974), containing an interesting analysis of proposed
statutory and judicial exceptions to the requirement of parental consent for
those under the age of 21. There have been corresponding changes in hospital
consent forms as a result; e.g., University Hospitals of Cleveland, Official
Memorandum No. 1289, Revised Operative Consent Policy (1973).
Contravening Prosser's statement are several cases in which minors in their
middle teens have been adjudged capable of giving consent. In Bishop v. Shurley, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926), for instance, a 19-year-old boy was
adjudged capable of choosing a local anesthetic over a general anesthetic in
a tonsillectomy despite the contrary preference of his parents. The real issue
turned on whether the choice proximately caused his death. Similarly, in Gulf
& S.I.R.R. v. Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501 (1928), the court held that
a 17-year-old boy employed by the railroad was legally capable of consenting
to smallpox vaccination given to him in the course of his employment. See
Curran & Beecher, Experimentation in Children: A Reexamination of Legal
Ethical Principles,210 J.A.M.A. 77 (1969).
106. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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quired before an operation on a minor. There was some question
that the mother had ratified her son's consent and the appellate court
held that if on retrial she was found to have ratified the boy's con10 7
sent, that would be sufficient.
Bonner is particularly interesting because by implication it approves a minor's participation in a nontherapeutic procedure, provided the consent of the parent has been assured.' 0 8 But even with
parental consent can the physician proceed in the nonbenefit setting? 109 A measure of the uncertainty can be found in companion
cases involving the first kidney transplant operations." 0 In these
cases, each involving pairs of minor twins, parents consented to the
transplantation of the healthy twin's kidney to his critically ill sibling."' The parents and the minor donors were anxious for the
transplant, which in each instance was the only hope for the desperately ill twin. Because there was no law on the issue in Massachusetts, or indeed anywhere, the hospital and surgeons were advised ,to seek declaratory judgments." 2 In each case the judge received evidence from a psychiatrist that there would be an adverse
emotional effect on the healthy twin if the operation were not performed and the sick twin died." 3 Curran points out that the court
felt obligated to look for and find a benefit to the donor as well as
11 4
the donee.
The view that parents cannot consent to procedures not directly
benefiting the child has a considerable following." 5 Philosophers
107. Id. at 123.
108. Curran & Beecher, supra note 105, at 79.
109. The absence of a firm legal basis for parental consent to participation
in research on behalf of the incompetent subject is discussed in 38 Fed. Reg.
31737, 31739, 31741 (1973).

110. Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20,
1957), Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30,
1957), and Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12,
1957), as reported by Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation

in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 891 (1959).
111. Curran, supra note 110, at 892.
112. Id. at 892.

113. Id. at 892-93.
114. See Curran & Beecher, supra note 105, at 79-80.

Curran and Beecher

believe these cases have been misinterpreted to mean a minor cannot participate in a medical procedure, including an experiment, unless it provides a benefit to him.
115. Dr. Charles V. Lowe, scientific director of the National Institutes of
Child Health and Human Development states: "inhere is no legal basis for
parental consent" to nontherapeutic research on children. Britain, in fact, prohibits nontherapeutic research on children under the age of 12. Medical News,
227 J.A.M.A. 13, 14 (1973).
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might argue that a measure of civilization is the extent to which a
society protects its helpless members. A physician has an obligation
to protect his patients, but where the physician-patient privilege does
not exist, as it did not at Willowbrook, -attempts to experiment with
minors place the experimenter on treacherous legal ground. In commenting upon the anomalous position of children in research, one
writer has remarked that the law is no help to a child unless he is
a donee of property.""' Nevertheless, the dialogue about children
*has helped us progress beyond the dark times under the common
law when children were chattels.
2. Prisoners
Other members of society much used as research subjects are
those in prison. Much has been written about this easily accessible pool of human "volunteers. 1 7 Voluntariness, the
quintessence of consent,"l8 is difficult to achieve and highly unlikely
in prison. The conclusion has been reached many times that no matter how altruistically the prisoner may approach his participation as
a volunteer, no matter how he or others may rationalize an opportunity for meaningful service to society, he cannot avoid the thought
that his sacrifice will be viewed favorably by the parole board. Less
philosophically, material advantages tempt him. He may receive
money which he needs desperately or an opportunity to be Teleased
from the grinding misery and fear of prison life."1 9
Lasagna notes that current concern for the use of prisoners reflects our changing social attitudes.' 2 0 Prisoners have probably been
2
used in medical experimentation since man conceived prisons.1 1 Of
particular interest is a 1967 report by two physicians on their use
116. Lowe, Pediatrics: Proper Utilization of Children as Research Subjects,
169 ANNALS OF N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 337 (1970).
117. E.g., Beecher, Experimentation in Man, 169 J.A.M.A. 461 (1959);
Ethics Governing the Service of Prisoners as Subjects in Medical Experiments,
136 J.A.M.A. 457 (1948); Hodges & Bean, The Use of Prisoners for Medical
Research, 202 J.A.M.A. 513 (1967).
118. Beecher, Consent in Clinical Experimentation: Myth and Realty, 195

J.A.M.A. 34 (1966).
119. Lasagna suggests, however, that to suppose that looking only to the
temptations of the prisoner is overly simplistic, since the impoverished student
who volunteers for money is equally the captive of poverty. Lasagna, Special
Subjects in Human Experimentation, in EXPiRuMENTATION wriH HuMAN Sun-

Jacrs 262, 271 (P. Freund ed. 1970).
120. Lasagna, supra note 119, at 262.
121. Id.
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of prisoners for research. 1 22 The doctors reported that they had had
no difficulty in securing the cooperation of the prisoners and prison
officials until the state attorney general ruled that it was not legal
to accept prisoners for medical research. The physicians then sought
and obtained passage of a statute permitting ,the use of prisoners. 123
The statute provides that a prisoner must volunteer his consent in
writing and that he may withdraw this consent at any time.124 It
appears to be the only such statute dealing with prisoner research.
Much concern has been expressed about the reduction of sentences in return for volunteering. A well-known study by a committee appointed by Illinois Governor Green during World War II observed that a prisoner's participation in medical experimentation
might be viewed as a form of good conduct and that reduction of
sentence under the parole system might be a reward for good conduct. 2 5 Nevertheless, the report cautioned that reduction of sentence must not be excessive because it would become a form of coercion inconsistent with the concept of voluntariness .' 2
A strong
statement by the American Medical Association expressed its disapproval of participation by persons accused of violent crimes and
its view that none of the prisoners participating in experimentation
27
should be considered for pardon.'
Most recently, a vigorous exchange occurred between a professor of medicine and a prisoner. Dr. Bach-Y-Rita stated that what
may be perceived as an acceptable risk for a person outside a prison
may be totally unacceptable for the same person inside because the
lack of unimpeded access to information, absence of advice from a
physician friend, lack of legal counsel, and the isolation from changing ideas of society restrict the prisoner's ability to assess the risk
he undertakes.' 28 A written response from a prisoner attacks what
the prisoner terms the stance of liberals who pose as friends of con122. Hodges & Bean, supra note 117.
123. Id. at 514.
124. IowA CODE ANN. § 246:47 (1964).
125. Ethics Governing the Service of Prisoners as Subjects in Medical Experiments, 136 J.A.M.A. 457, 458 (1948); see Freund, Ethical Problems in Human Experimentation, 273 NEw ENG. J. MED. 687 (1965).
126. Ethics Governing the Service of Prisoners as Subjects in Medical Experiments, 136 J.A.M.A. 457, 458 (1948).
127. House of Delegates of the American Medical Ass'n, Resolution
on Disapprovalof Participationin Scientific Experiments by Inmates of Penal
Institutions, from Digest of Official Actions, in Katz 1025.
128. Bach-Y-Rita, The PrisonerAs An Experimental Subject, 229 J.A.M.A.
45 (1974).
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victs. 1 2 9

He states that participation in medical research is one of

the few free choices a man has in prison. 130 Similar vocalization
by other prisoners may be more helpful than judgments made by
members of the outside world looking in.
3.

The Mentally Infirm

In the unending colloquy about proper experimentation a third
category of volunteers requires special attention-the mentally infirm,' 3 ' perhaps better described as those with behavioral disturb-

ances. About these individuals, the observation has been made that
"[P]ersons encumbered with the economic or custodial responsibility for the mentally infirm might not be sufficiently objective to
make judgments which are fully in the best interest of the institutionalized person."' 3 2 Work with the mentally ill is surely enveloped
with even greater uncertainty than work with children or prisoners.
Abuse of children is not generally tolerated by society and prison
sentences may be finite, but the terrible fact of confinement of unknown duration increases the vulnerability of those exhibiting mental
infirmity. Frequently their families and guardians are driven to
desperate measures by the disruption which their condition or illness
33
can create.'
a. Psychosurgery. One recent focus of attention in experimentation to aid the mentally ill has been the quandary engendered by
the difficulty of obtaining truly informed consent from patient,
parent, or guardian for the experimental surgical alteration in behavior, termed psychosurgery.' 3 - The controversy over this highly
technical procedure has become increasingly rancorous.'3 3 Those
who use the technique believe that specific diseased sites in the brain
are responsible for undesirable behavior. To eliminate unwanted
129.
130.
131.
132.

Letter from Frank Hatfield to the Editor, 229 J.A.M.A. 1720 (1974).
Id. at 1721.
Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 30648, 30652 (1974).
Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. 31738, 31745 (1973).

133. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
134. B. BROWN, L. WmNcHowsml & L. BRowN, PSYCHOSUrGERY: PERSPECTIVE ON A CtUNT IssUE (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare Pub.
No. [HSMHA] 73-9119, 1973).
135. For perceptive reporting and an excellent status report see Medical
News, 225 I.A.M.A. 1035 (1973).
A measure of the antipathy toward psychosurgery may be seen in the
"Butcher of the Year" Award given to a well-known neurosurgeon for his activity. Albertson, Psychosurgery Hits Back Against Racism Charges, Hospital
Tribune, Jan. 21, 1974, at 2, col. 1.

496

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 25:472

destructive behavior, they argue, the diseased or abnormal cells of
13 6
the brain must be eliminated.
Psychosurgery employs surgical excision or deliberate destruction
of brain tissue by means of an electrical current applied to the suspect tissues or nerve cells within the brain. Current is directed to
the diseased site by means of electrodes implanted in the brain
through burr holes drilled into the skull.' 37 The electrodes can be
left in place as long as 6 weeks while neurophysiologic data are as1 38
sembled.
Once surgery is performed, the treated portion of the brain is
permanently altered or destroyed. 13 9 Through the use of sophisticated medical instrumentation, such as stereotaxic machines and xray beams, 140 and demanding -techniques, an attempt is made to pinpoint the exact locus in the brain responsible for undesirable behavior and hopefully the destruction of "only those tissues and nerve
cells [will ensue] leaving other functions and behaviors of the patient
tient unaffected."' 14' Unfortunately if healthy or nonaffected brain
tissue is also destroyed it will not regenerate, for the effect of psychosurgery is irreversible.
Ideally, psychosurgeons hope by these direct or mechanical
means to free severely disturbed individuals from the tyranny of their
compulsive, uncontrolled behavior.' 42 The bitterness of the controversy, however, is seen in conflicting reports in the medical literature about the efficacy of the results obtained. Typically, advocates
of the procedure maintain that psychosurgery is performed upon individuals whose aberrant or violent behavior torments them or their
families. 43 Case histories present a repetitive pattern of aggressive,
wild -actions, expressed as self-mutilation, -attempted suicide, or even
homicide.14 4 The desperation which their uncontrollable deeds
136. 1973 Hearings pt. 2, at 349; V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE

BRAIN 70 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MARK & ERVIN).
137. Sweet, Treatment of Medically Intractable Mental Disease by Limited

FrontalLeucotomy-ustifiable?, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1117 (1973).
138. Medical News, 225 J.A.M.A. 914, 915 (1973).

139. 1973 Hearingspt. 2, at 360.
140. MARK & ERVIN 71-85. See also PsYCHOSURGERY: PERSPECVE ON A
CuRRENT IssuE, supra note 134, at 1.
141. Testimony of Dr. Bertram Brown, Director of National Institute of
Mental Health, 1973 Hearingspt. 2 at 344.
142. Mark & Nevelle, Brain Surgery in Aggressive Epileptics, 226 J.A.M.A.
765 (1973).
143. 1973 Hearingspt. 2, at 349, 350.
144. Id.

19751

WHO SHALL DECIDE?

cause such patients, their families, and their psychiatrists cannot be
minimized. Sometimes these patients have suffered organic brain
disease such as encephalitis; sometimes they have sustained a severe
head injury; but more frequently the cause of their behavior is not
known.

145

The growing number of advocates for the technique, believing
that the brain is structurally abnormal in these people, stress that
drug therapy or other generally accepted modes of psychiatric treatment do not control them. Relief, they believe, can be obtained only
through techniques which deal directly with the "structural" anomaly. 140 Exponents of a middle-of-the-road philosophy believe that
despite the stab in the dark which characterizes psychosurgery, the
14 7
core personality of the patient remains unchanged by the process.
Countering the zeal of the psychosurgeons are opinions like those
expressed by Dr. Bertram Brown, Director of the National Institutes
of Mental Health, that the procedure falls short of the goals expressed by its advocates and "even the best research in this field is
not able to achieve ... precision.' 48

Critics of psychosurgery are

disturbed because the treatment is used when the nature of the patient's illness is far from clear. Despite the claims of its proponents,
psychosurgery is, in fact, performed in the absence of direct evidence
of the structural brain disease of which they speak. 149 Basic to the
opposition to psychosurgery is the belief that it is nothing more than
mind control. Critics believe that the step from controlling the mind
of one believed to be mentally Mlto controlling any human behavior
is very short. 50
A particularly strong critic of the technique has been Dr. Peter
Breggin, 151 who characterizes the process as "a pacifying operation
which blunts the emotions and subdues behavior regardless of the
presence or absence of any brain disease or any particular psychiatric
problem."' 152 Breggin argues that psychosurgery "partially destroys
145. Medical News, 225 J.A.M.A. 916-17 (1973) (encephalitis; unknown
causes); Medical News, 226 J.A.M.A. 19-20 (1973) (head injury).
146. E.g., 1973 Hearingspt. 2, at 349.
147. Medical News, 225 J.A.M.A. 1037, 1041 (1973).
148. 1973 Hearingspt. 2, at 344.
149. Id. at 339.
150. MARK & EViN 125; 118 CONG. Rc. 11396 (1972); Letter from Peter
R. Breggin to the Editor, in 226 J.A.M.A. 1121 (1973).
M. C cRoN,TEhmrgAL MAN (1972) is a popular novel about the control
of a violent individual by the implantation of an electronic device in his brain.
151. Dr. Breggin is a practicing psychiatrist in Washington, D.C.
152. 1973 Hearingspt. 2, at 439.
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a human being."' 153 He alleges that the most frequent candidates
are not psychotics but hyperactive children and women suffering
54
from neuroses manifested as depression, anxiety, or obsession.'
Whether the technique is employed upon mere neurotics, as Breggin
argues, or upon those whose behavior is actually beyond control,' 55
experience indicates that the subjects of psychosurgery have case
histories of intractable illness. By and large they have been under psychiatric treatment long enough to determine that nonsurgical therapy has not been effective. Breggin testified during Senate
Subcommittee hearings that neurosurgeons practicing psychosurgery
fail to obtain the consent of affected persons. 156 But, since such unfortunate individuals are always in stressful situations, the validity
of their consent is always debatable.
The issue of consent to this drastic procedure was the precise
question which gave rise to -thefirst court decision on psychosurgery;
the patient involved in the case was in fact a prisoner. In Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health,157 an alleged murderer and rapist had been confined to 'a state hospital because of
his homicidal rages. He alleged he had no hope of release until he
"volunteered" to participate in a program comparing the effects of
drug therapy and psychosurgery. An attorney, a member of the
Medical Committee for Human Rights, 158 hearing of the case petitioned the court to enjoin the procedure. The court ordered the inmate released, stressing -the legal inability of an involuntarily detained mental patient to consent to psychosurgery. 59 The court
stated that psychosurgery should never be performed on an involuntarily confined person. Kaimowitz is a strongly worded opinion, reflecting the judge's horror at the prospect of physicial intervention
in the brain by irreversibly destroying part of it. Echoing Breggin,
the court said:
Experimental psychosurgery, which is irreversible and intrusive often leads to the blunting of emotions, the deadening of memory, the reduction of affect, and limits the ability
to generate new ideas. Its potential for injury to the creativity of the individual is great, and can impinge upon the
153. Medical News, 225 J.A.M.A. 916 (1973).
154. 1973 Hearingspt. 2, at 360.

155. Medical News, 225 I.A.M.A. 1036 (1973).
156. 1973 Hearingspt. 2, at 363.

157. 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich. 1973).
158. Medical News, 225 JA.MA. 1035, 1036 (1973).
159. 42 U.S.L.W. at 2064.
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right of the individual to be free from interference with his
mental processes. 1 60
In the court's view three elements are necessary for consent:
competence, (2) knowledge, and (3) voluntariness. 161

(1)

Noting the law's vigilance against inequality of bargaining power
in many legal relations and the inherently coercive nature of a mental institution, the court turned its attention to the depersonalizing
effect of institutions and the resulting inequality of mental patients
who cannot reason as equals with doctors and administrators. 1 62
The court did not rely solely on informed consent arguments, but
also found that under the first amendment the government has no
power or right to control men's minds.' 63 Thus, an involuntarily detained person may not consent to psychosurgery. The language in
Kaimnowitz is usually forceful, and the case is another example of
Michigan's well-reasoned stand on medicolegal problems.
Two unreported cases on psychosurgery have also considered the
issue of the informed consent to psychosurgery.' 64 In Virginia a
deeply disturbed patient's acts of self-mutilation led his parents to
agree to psychosurgery. The Virginia Attorney General's office,
learning of the proposed procedure, intervened in behalf of the patient. The court stayed the surgery on the ground of the patient's
inability to give consent.' 65 In the second case, which was settled
before trial, the plaintiff, blinded from psychosurgery, recovered settlement on the ground that she was inadequately informed of the
risk in the procedure. 66
b. Aversive Therapeutic Techniques. Another example of judicial antipathy to tinkering with the mental processes may be found
in a second case involving a prisoner, Mackey v. Procunier.167 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to
the district court on the ground that the lower court had treated
plaintiff's complaint as one alleging malpractice when, in fact, his
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Medical News, 225 J.A.M.A. 1035, 1036, 1044 (1973).
165. Id. at 1044.
166. Id. A third case, Kille v. Mark, No. 681998 (Mass. Super. Ct., filed
Dec. 3, 1973) has drawn a great deal of attention. See MARK & ERVIN (for an
exposition of their views on psychosurgery); Dietz, Hub Psychosurgery Draws
2 Million Suit, Boston Globe, Dec. 10, 1973, at 3, col. 4.
167. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
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case went far beyond such claim.1 68 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, alleged he consented to electroshock therapy as a behavior modification technique. Instead of receiving shock therapy, the plaintiff was
given succinylcholine, a drug generally used as an adjunct to electroshock and given while the patient is unconscious. 169 Succinylcholine
is a terrifying drug. It stops the patient's breathing and produces
feelings of imminent death.' 70 The administration of succinycholine
was part of an experiment designed to test aversive therapy for
prisoners. 71 By exposing the prisoner to this painful and frightening
experience accompanied by psychological suggestion, alteration of a
172
criminal behavior pattern was sought.
Knecht v. Gillman 73 presents another example of the questionable value of aversive therapy for prisoners. In the Iowa Security
Medical Facility, a drug, apomorphine, was administered for "pieces
of behavior" such as refusing to get up, giving cigarettes against orders, talking, swearing, or lying, and other violations of prison protocol. Apomorphine causes vomiting and changes in cardiovascular
balance. Once administered, its effect is irreversible.
In Knecht, the drug was administered by nursing personnel without their personal observation of the imate's prohibited behavior but
upon the report of other prisoners and without specific authorization
of doctors. Holding the "treatment" an instance of cruel and unusual punishment, its administration was enjoined except with written
consent from the prisoner which could be withdrawn at any time.
Each injection was required to be authorized by a physician upon
personal observation by the professional staff. No attention was
given in the case to the questionable morality of the treatment shown
in the face of "informed consent." Curiously, Iowa is the state which
by statute permits experimentation on prisoners with their consent
only.
F.

The Evolution of Federal Guidancefor the Researcher

A number of the problems which have been reviewed in the pre168. Id.
169. Id.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. A Cleveland newspaper has given an account of the use of hypnosis
and electric shock in the treatment of child molesters. Twice a week 12 inmate volunteers viewed slides of nude children. Each slide was accompanied
by an electric shock to the prisoner's groin. Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Dec.
6, 1973, at 9-G, col. 6.

173. 488 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1973).
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ceding sections began to be identified very soon after World War
II. As early as 1952, a few astute observers pointed out that some
of the research being undertaken involved the unconsidered use of
1 74
human beings.
Although, in general, public and private granting agencies scrutinized grant requests for originality of thought, validity of methodology, and expectation of success, the matter of securing consent was
left to -theconscience of the individual investigator. Some inquiries
about securing consent were made by Dr. Louis Welt, 175 and a
pioneering conference on the Legal Environment of Medical Science
was held at the University of Chicago under the leadership of attorneys Irving Ladimer and William Curran. 7 6 By and large, however,
until a number of events occurred almost simultaneously, "there was
a general skepticism toward the development of ethical guidelines,
77
codes, or sets of procedures concerning the conduct of research."'
It was not that doctors were unconcerned but that they believed the
ethical judgment of each physician would lead him to the deepest
78
consideration for his subjects.'
1. Development of PeerReview
The NIH, however, was not satisfied with the vague reliance
upon the conscience of the investigator. From the beginning, -theNIH
administrators believed (and there was evidence that much legal
consideration was given to this point) that the traditional doctor-patient relationship prevailed and thereby protected those ill subjects
who came to the Center for study.'1 9 They were uncertain, however,
174. See, e.g., Bean, Testament of Duty: Some Strictures on Moral Responsibilities in Clinical Research, 39 J. LABORATORY MED. 3 (1952); Cady,
Medical Malpractice: What About Experimentation?, 6 ANNALs OF W. MED.
& SURGERY 164 (1952).
175. Welt, Reflections on the Problems of Human Experimentation, 25
CoNN. MED. 75, 78 (1961) (results of poll of university departments of medicine in 1961).
176. See Report on the National Conference on the Legal Environment of
Medical Science, reprinted in CLINICAL INVESTIGATION IN MEDIcINE: LEGAL,
ETHICAL, AND MoAL ASPETS 138 (I. Ladimer & R. Newman eds. 1963). The
conference was held on May 27-28, 1959 in Chicago. Dr. Irving Ladimer
served as Secretary of the Conference. Id. at iv. Curran, Governmental Reg-

ulations of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Research: The Approach
of Two Federal Agencies, in EXPERIMENTATION Wr'h HUMAN SUBJEcTs 402,
408 (P. Freund ed. 1970).
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Page, Medical Ethics, 152 SCIENCE 1 (1966); Welt, supra
note 175, at 78; When Is Consent?, THE LANCET, Oct. 14, 1967, at 813.

179. Frankel, The Public Health Service Guidelines Governing Research
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about the legal status of normal volunteers and the Government's
responsibility for them. In response .to this uncertainty, in 1953 the
NIH issued guidelines for the protection of normal volunteers.1 80
The guidelines were entitled "Group Consideration of Clinical Research Procedures Deviating From Accepted Medical Practice or
Involving Unusual Hazard."'81
Departure from medical practice,
the touchstone of the old malpractice cases, was thus squarely confronted in the nontherapeutic situation. Investigators were directed
that written consent of the normal volunteer was required in the face
of unusual hazard.' 82 Most important in the guidelines was the initiation of a system of review of the ethics of the investigator by his
colleagues.' s 3
At first this review by the researcher's peers and the guidelines
for his activities were internal and not applicable to the large number
of investigators working outside the NIH who were funded by the
United States Public Health Service.' 8 4 That the need for securing
the informed consent of experimental subjects was also being considered by such outside workers seems certain. Study sections and
other advisory groups which reviewed grant applications for the Public Health Service were composed of first-rate investigators who were
members of the scientific societies whose journals provided a forum
for discussion of -the issue.' 8 5 In 1960, ,two years after the conference on the Legal Environment of Medical Science conducted
by Laclimer,' 8 6 the NIH funded the Law-Medicine Research Institute of Boston University Law School for the purpose of studying
legal, moral, and ethical issues involved in clinical investigation in
the United States. 187 In 1964 and 1965, especially at -the time of
Involving Human Subjects: An Analysis of the Policy-Making Process, in PROGRAM OF POLICY STUDIES IN SCmNCE AND TECHNOLOGY 10 (George Washington

Univ. Monograph No. 10, 1972).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 12.
183. Id. at 11.
184. Id. at 12.
185. Id. at 13. For examples of the discussions in medical journals, see
Beecher, Experimentation in Man, 169 J.A.M.A. 461 (1959); Freund, Ethical
Problems in Human Experimentation, 273 NEw ENG. J.MED. 687 (1965)
(The New England Journal of Medicine is the official journal of the Massachusetts Medical Society); Wolfensberger, Ethical Issues in Research with Human Subjects, 155 SCIENCE 47 (1967).

186. See note 176 supra and accompanying text.
187. Frankel, supra note 179, at 18; cf. Curran,supra note 176, at 406 n.21.
Curran says the Institute was established in 1958.
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Hyman, James A. Shannon, the NIH director, pressed his staff to
develop a mechanism for peer review of proposed research at institutions outside the NIH. 88
Thereafter, in 1966, Surgeon General William Stewart issued a
written policy which imposed upon the research institutions supported by the Public Health Service a peer review system similar
to that used by the NTIH Clinical Center. 1 89 The review was to assure independent determination of the rights and welfare of individuals involved in clinical studies, the appropriateness of methods used
to secure their informed consent, and an assessment of the risk-benefit ratio, i.e., was the benefit consonant with the risk to the subject?' 90 Five months later, a revised policy required further assurance from the funded institution of the propriety of its policies, procedures of review, and decisions regarding plans for human experimentation.' 9 ' Still later that year, a further clarification was issued
indicating that the policy was also to be applicable to -the behavioral
and social sciences,' 92 fields in which, to this author's mind, many
19 3
damaging experiments had proceeded unchecked.
Concurrent with its policy statements and the establishment of
the peer review system, the NIH Clinical Center issued the Handbook of the Normal Volunteer Patient Program of the Clinical Cen-

ter, in which informed consent in the experimental situation was de188. Frankel, supra note 179, at 19-31.
189. Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Clinical Research and Investigations Involving Human Beings, Feb. 8, 1966 (memorandum to the heads of
institutes conducting research with Public Health Service grants), accompanying PPO No. 129, Clinical Investigation Using Human Subjects, Feb. 8, 1966
(available through HEW).
190. Id.
191. Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Revised Procedure on Clinical
Research and Investigations Involving Human Subjects, July 1, 1966 (memorandum to heads of institutions receiving Public Health Service grants), accompanying PPO No. 129, Revised Policy July 1, 1966, superseding PPO No.
129, Clinical Investigation Using Human Subjects, Feb. 8, 1966 and PPO No.
129 Supp., Apr. 7, 1966 (available through U.S. Public Health Service, Division of Research Grants).
192. Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Clarification of Procedure on
Clinical Research and Investigation Involving Human Subjects, Dec. 12, 1966
(memorandum to heads of institutions receiving Public Health Service grants).
193. See Katz 358-69, 436-51 (for reports of behavioral studies); Privacy
and Behavioral Research: Preliminary Summary of the Report of the Panel
on Privacy and Behavioral Research, 155 SciENcF 535 (1967). For an excellent survey of controversial behavioral studies, see Marcus, Book Review,

N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1974, § 7, at 1, which reviews
AuTHoRr: AN ExPE~unENTAL Vmw (1973).

MIuRAm, OBEDmNCE TO
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fined.' 94 It was to be "[a] formal, explicit free expression of willingness to serve as a subject for research after the values and effects
of such participation have been explained by the investigator and
are sufficiently understood for the volunteer to make a mature judgment."' 1 5 The definition, obviously not perfect, represents considerably more guidance than researchers had secured from the
Hyman court, and parallels what is being expressed in the most recent malpractice cases. A revision of the definition added a requirement for explaining any attendant risk or discomfort. 1 6
Another example of the growing attention to the protection of
human subjects was found in the Grants Administration Manual of
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in the section discussing the protection of human subjects. 197 First issued in 1959, it
contained a detailed exposition of the criteria for determining risk
and protection. One of the best definitions of informed consent appeared therein.' 98 Briefly, it required that the patient or his representative be given a fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, a description of possible discomforts and risks, a description
of possible benefits, a disclosure of alternative procedures, an offer
to answer all inquiries, and a clear enunciation of the patient's freedom to withdraw from the study at any time.
These formal expressions of the ethics of human experimentation
by the NIH and the Public Health Service were exemplary of the
growing sensitivity of concerned investigators to the problems they
faced.
Im. FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION

For those outside the NIH and the Public Health Service, 1962
might be deemed the crucial year. At the same time the Helsinki
194. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HELTH CLINICAL CENTER, HANDBOOK ON
THE NORMAL VOLUNTEER PATIENT PROGRAM (rev.

ed.

1966).

195. Id. at iv.
196. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH CLINICAL CENTER, HANDBOOK ON
THE NORMAL VOLUNTEER PATIENT PROGRAM OF THE CLINICAL CENTER (rev.

ed. 1967).
197. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, GRANTS ADMINISTRATION MANuAL pt. I, cs. 1-40, Protectionof Human Subjects (1971) [hereinafter cited as GRANTS ADMINISTRATION MANUAL]. The Grants Administration
Manual was issued as GRANTS AND AwARD PROGRAMS OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, POLICY & INFORMATION STATEMENT IN RESEARCH GRANTS (1959).

This information was kindly provided by Dr. Robert Akers of the NIH.
198. GRANTS ADMINISTAuTION MANuAL 2.
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Declaration was being considered,1 99 the Senate held hearings to investigate drug industry monopolies. 200 At this time the heartbreaking thalidomide catastrophe in Germany also came to light. 20 1
Curiously, testimony about thalidomide and the heroic intransigence of Dr. Frances Kelsey of the Food and Drug Administration,
who refused to allow the drug on the market, was never recorded
2
at the hearings. 20

20 3
The horrifying details of the drug's effects,

however, must surely have impressed Congress, because it quickly
passed the Drug Amendments of 1962, which made profound
20 4
changes in the regulation of the pharmaceutical houses.
Too often corrective legislation comes only after a predictable
tragedy has occurred and drug legislation is no exception. A pattern
for drug testing was started in 1938 when the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act 205 was promulgated after hundreds died because of an
industry error in which sulfanilamide was compounded as an elixir
with a deadly poison. 20 6 During the next 25 years, limited control
199. See, e.g., Bukantz, The Helsinki Declaration, 2 HosprrAL PRACTICE 24
(Jan. 1967); Declaration of Helsinki, 271 NEw ENG. J. MED. 473 (1964), reporting British views on human experimentation and the work of the World
Medical Association.
200. Hearings on S. Res. 276 Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and
International Organizationsof the Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1962).
201. Beachboard, Investigational Drugs: Experimentation or Medical Practice, 20 Food DRUG Cosm. L.J 256, 268 (1965).
202. Curran, supra note 176, at 409.
203. Ten thousand babies were born in Germany and Great Britain suffering phocomelia, i.e., the misshapenness and absence of limbs. The defects
were traced to their mothers' ingestion of thalidomide, a tranquilizer, during
the critical second and third months of pregnancy when the fetus develops
arms and legs.
204. The Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780,
amending Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970).
205. Id. § 355.
206. Deaths Due to Elixir of Sulfanilamide-MassengillReport of Sec'y of
Agriculture Submitted in Response to H. Res. 352 of Nov. 18, 1937 and S.
Res. 194 of Nov. 16, 1937, 109 J.A.M.A. 1985 (1937). "Mhe only basis
of action under the Food and Drugs Act against the interstate distribution of
the 'elixir' was the allegation that the word implies an alcoholic solution
whereas the product was a diethylene glycol solution." Id. at 1987. The Department of Agriculture, under whose aegis the Food and Drugs Act was administered, recommended legislation. The first recommendation was licensing
of control of new drugs to insure they would not be distributed until experimental and clinical tests had shown them to be safe for use. Exemptions would
be made for new drugs distributed to competent investigators for experimental
work. The second recommendation was prohibition of drugs dangerous to
health when administered in accordance with manufacturer's directions for use.
This would provide a more appropriate basis of action than that on which pro-
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over drug manufacture and sale was attempted. Under FDA regulations, 20 7 drugs had first to be tested in animals, then in selected
volunteers, 20 8 and -then marketed under restricted conditions before
general release. Unfortunately, the FDA merely required drug
manufacturers to apply for an investigational-use exemption. By
labeling the medicine as a new drug and one limited to investiga20 9
tional use, the manufacturer was free to distribute it.
A.

The 1962 Drug Amendments

Thus, although well intentioned, the 1938 regulations were sadly
inadequate. The 1962 amendments tightened the requirements for
introduction of drugs into commerce by requiring prior evidence of
the drug's safety and efficacy, a description of its components and
method of manufacture, and the submission of specimen labeling to
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. 210 The most important part of the amendments, however, lay in the Investigational
New Drug2 11 provisions, which exempted from restricted interstate
movement those drugs intended solely for investigational use by experts qualified by scientific training and experience. As a condition
for exemption, the investigator had to certify that he had informed
his human subjects, both patients and controls, of the investigatory
nature of the drug unless it was not feasible or the investigator judged
21 2
consent would be contrary to the subject's interests.
Although the safeguards for patient and subject written into the
1962 amendments were regarded as drastic when introduced, 213 the
feasibility provision nevertheless permitted some unethical practices
to proceed unchecked.2 1 4 The FDA regulations on consent had
ceedings were instituted against the "elixir." Third, it was proposed that drug
labels bear appropriate directions for use and warnings against probable misuse. Last, the Department recommended prohibition of secret remedies by requiring that labels disclose fully the composition of drugs. Id. at 1988.
207. 21 C.F.R. §§ 130 et seq. (1962).

208. See Beachboard, supra note 201, at 260.
209. Curran, supra note 176, at 410.

210. The Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780,
amending Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970).
The thalidomide experience was the precipitating event for the tightened regulations. See Alshire, 13 GROUP PRAcTIcE 433, 434 (1964).
211. 21 C.F.R. § 130.3 (1962).
212. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Food and Drug Admin-

istration Form FD 1572, If 6(g), in 21 C.F.R. § 130.3 (1962). See also 1973
Hearingspt. 1, at 36-37.
213. Informed Consent in Drug Research, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoB., Oct.
24, 1966, at S-4, S-7 n.105.
214. Curran, supra note 176, at 419.
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merely repeated the language of the Act 215 but in 1966 the FDA
promulgated new regulations that defined the scope of the exceptions
to the consent requirements. 216 The feasibility exception was limited
to cases in which consent could not be obtained because the patient
could not communicate, e.g., because he was comatose.2 1- The exception for cases in which securing consent would be contrary to the
best interests of the subject was made strictly applicable to situations
in which communication of the information -to obtain consent would
seriously affect the patient's disease state.21 8 Another amendment
passed in 1970 provided a further brake to untrammeled, unauthorized experimentation by interposing a 30-day waiting period between the -time a proposed work was approved and the start of
clinical trials, in order to verify that animal investigation had pre21 9
ceded the proposed human studies.
Despite careful honing of the regulations to control use of new
drugs without the proper restraint, they may still allow experimentation to take place without FDA supervision in some instances. Once
a new drug has been shipped in interstate commerce for its approved
use, a physician may lawfully prescribe that new drug for an unapproved use when -thatprescription is part of the practice of medicine. 220 Thus, a higher dosage, use in an unapproved subject, or
use in a different disease may occur. Here, the burden of recognizing the investigational aspect of such use and consideration of the attendant moral and ethical obligations it imposes are placed upon the
doctor. 221 The FDA, however, has various means for controlling this
unapproved use. It may stop such usage or require relabeling when
it determines it may endanger patients or create a public health haz222
ard or conversely that a benefit has been created.
B.

UnethicalPracticesin Drug Research Despite Regulation

Even with -theincreasing attention focused on safety and consent,
the FDA has found instances of unethical practices which raise the
question whether ethical judgments can be assured by regulations.
215. Id. at 417.
216. 21 C.F.R. § 130.37 (1967) (consent for use of investigational drugs
in humans; Statement of policy).
217. Id. § 130.37(f).
218. Id. § 130.37(g).
219. 1973 Hearingspt. 1, at 37-38.
220. Proposed HEW Reg. § 130(a) (3), 37 Fed. Reg. 16504 (1972).

221. Id.
222. Id.§ 130(b), 37 Fed. Reg. 16504 (1972).
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In 1967 the FDA established a six-man Scientific Investigations
Group headed by Dr. Frances Kelsey, the thalidomide heroine, to
determine the truth of data submitted by drug investigators.2 23 To
date, her committee has investigated 50 physicians in private practice, of whom 16 are said to have supplied false data. 224 In May
1973, one physician was indicted by a grand jury for having submitted false data on two drugs to two drug companies. 223 Part of
the problem is that investigators are frequently paid by drug houses
for their investigations. One scientific journal comments:
A sophisticated study of two dozen patients for 2 weeks
may net an investigator $6500. If the investigator should
elect to submit the same data to another sponsor, he will
receive $13,000 for his 2 weeks' work. Several clinical investigators are known to gross
more than $1 million a year
22 6
from their testing programs.
Another fraud uncovered by Dr. Kelsey's committee was the reporting of information about prisoners and mental patients as present
data, weeks after the subjects had been released. The committee
found that in some cases consent consisted of obtaining "X" marks
from senile patients and that some consents were "executed" posthumously. Upon questioning, the patients were frequently unaware
that they were part of a medical experiment.22 7 The resemblance
228
to Hyman is worthy of mention.
These examples show that regulations, no matter how precisely
drawn, do not automatically enhance the ethical sensitivity of those
involved in research. The work of Dr. Kelsey's committee demonstrates that peer review can be a very effective weapon.
C. Codification by the HEW
Undoubtedly influenced by the drug falsification experiences of
223. Physicians Who Falsify Drug Data, 180 SCmNCE 1038 (1973).

224. Id. Falsification of drug research results is not a new phenomenon.
In 1966, FDA inspectors reported that two doctors had filed false data on
Regimen tablets. Unsavory Aspects of the Clinical Trial, 275 NEw ENG. J.

MED. 1198 (1966).
225. Physicians Who Falsify Drug Data, supra note 223, at 1038.

226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 42 Misc. 2d 427, 248 N.Y.S.

2d 245 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1964), rev'd,
15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965). See text accompanying notes 77-89 supra.
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the FDA, by events like the Mackey v. Procuner229 case, by the
growing sense that the NIH guidelines lacked the force of law, and
by the looming certainty of federal legislation, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) codified the existing NIH
policies for the protection of human subjects. 23 0 The basic policy
of the regulations provides that no activity that is supported by an
HEW grant or contract and that involves placing human subjects at
risk shall be undertaken unless a committee of the organization applying for funds has reviewed and approved the proposed activity.
The organization must furnish certification of that review and approval to HEW. 231 "Subject at risk" is defined as an individual exposed to the possibility of physical, psychological, or social injury as
a result of participation in a research project or a related activity that
departs from the accepted methods necessary to meet his needs or
that increases the ordinary risks of daily life, including those inherent
in the subject's occupation. 23 2 When the review committee decides
that a subject is at risk, it must then determine:
(1) if the risk is sufficiently outweighed by 'the sum of the
potential benefit to the subject and the importance of the
knowledge to be gained, so as to warrant the decision
to allow the subject to accept the risk;
(2) if the rights and welfare of -the subject will be adequately protected; and
(3) if legally informed
consent is being obtained by appro233
priate methods.
The applicant organization must assure HEW that the supported research activity will be reviewed at timely intervals and that the or229. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973). See notes 167-71 supra and accompanying text.
230. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.1-.22 (1974). Technical amendments -to these regulations were promulgated as this issue went to press. The amendments substituted the words "institutions" and "Institutional Review Board" for existing ref-

erences to "organizations" and "committees" respectively. The amendments
eliminate the inconsistent terminology between the National Research Service
Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342, and HEW regulations.
The reader is asked to read "organizations" as "institutions," and "committee"
as "Institutional Review Board." Wherever the terms "application" or "proposal" appeared singly in the final regulations, both terms now appear together.
Other changes were minor and may be found by consulting 40 Fed. Reg. 11854
(1975).
231. Id. § 46.2(a). For certification requirement see § 46.11.
232. Id. § 46.3(b).
233. Id. § 46.2(b).
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ganization will assume responsibility for the subjects involved. 234 No
delineation of the organization's responsibility for the subject is provided, however. Presumably the regulations mean that
the organization will provide medical care if adverse results obtain, but the regulations do not expressly so state, nor do they give
guidance about the extent or duration of such care. The responsibility of organizations engaging in behavioral research is even less
certain. Does the responsibility, for example, encompass psychotherapy if the subject is harmed by the experiment? No answers
are provided by the Department.

An applicant organization with a significant number of HEW
supported activities must file a general assurance with the Department that HEW policies will be met in proposed ongoing research.23,
A special assurance must be given for a single project or activity, but
it is not solicited if a general assurance is on file with the Secretary.2 3 6 A general assurance must take the form of a statement of
the principles respecting the rights and welfare of experimental subjects. 2 37 It must describe the procedures by which initial and continuing review of research shall be conducted and the procedures which
the review committee will adopt to advise and counsel the investigator of the applicant institution. Procedures for the prompt reporting of proposed changes in research activities, of unanticipated
results, and of adverse effects must also be detailed.2 8
The crux of the regulations appears in the requirements for the
composition and activities of an organizational review committee.2 39
This critical committee, charged with the task of protecting experimental subjects by initial and continuing review must be composed
of not less than five persons of diverse backgrounds, who must possess the professional competence to review specific research activities
to ascertain the acceptability of the research in terms of organizational commitments, applicable law, standards of conduct, and community attitudes. 240 The committee "must therefore include persons
'241
whose concerns are in this area."
234. Id. § 46.2(c).
235. Id. § 46.4(a). General assurances are applicable to all HEW-supported activities of the applicant institution. Special assurances are applicable
to a single activity or project.

236. Id. § 46.5(b).
237. Id. § 46.5(a).
238. Id. § 46.7(e).
239. Id. § 46.6(b) (2).

240. Id. § 46.6(b)(1).
241. Id.
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The regulations do not specify the occupations or interests of
these individuals, but Dr. Donald Chalkley, a principal drafter of
the regulations, has suggested that, in addition to persons competent
to make scientific judgments, lawyers, ministers, and representative
members of the community served by the applicant organization,
such as members of hospital auxilliary boards or board members of
health organizations like the American Cancer Society, would be the
most appropriate members.2 42 Citizen members need not bring professional expertise to the deliberations of this committee, but would
convey community attitudes to the group. Ideally, the lawyers,
ministers, and other professional members would bring the knowledge of their own disciplines. 243 Nothing in the regulations however,
prohibits the lay members of the committee from making scientific
judgments, e.g., assessing the importance of the knowledge to be
gained.
Very detailed instructions are given regarding the organizational
review committee's duty to assure that legally effective consent of
experimental subjects is obtained. 244 The phrase, "legally effective"
is undefined. The regulations do not make clear whether it is the
duty of a lawyer-member to make that legal judgment or whether the
judgment shall be the product of the labors of the committee as a
whole. The definition of informed consent, however, is set out in
the very terms so painstakingly worked out over the years in the
Grants Administration Manual245 by the NIH scientists and staff,
people not now considered competent under the regulations to make
the judgment unaided by laymen.
'Informed consent is defined as the knowing consent of the subject or his legally authorized representative exercised freely in the
absence of undue inducement, force, fraud, or coercion. 24 6 The information that must be imparted to the subject includes a fair explanation of what procedures are to be followed, what the purposes
of the procedures are, and what experimental aspects are involved
242. Telephone interview with Dr. Donald Chalkey, Chief of the Institutional Relations Branch, Division of Research Grants, National Institutes of
Health, Dec. 5, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Telephone Interview].
243. Id.
244. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.9 (1974), for mention of legally effective consent;
id. § 46.3 (c) for a definition of informed consent.
245. See text accompanying notes 184-86 supra; Frankel, The Public Health
Service Guidelines Governing Research Involving Human Subjects: An Analysis of the Policy-Making Process, in PtoGRAM OF POLICY STUIES nr SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY 42 (George Washington Univ. Monograph No. 10, 1972).

246. 45 C.F.R. § 46.3(c) (1974).
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in the procedure. The subject must also be given a description of
the attendant risks and discomforts associated with the proposed procedures, a description of the benefits reasonably to be expected, and
a disclosure of appropriate alternative methods. An offer to answer
any inquiries and instruction that the subject is free to withdraw
at any time are also required. 247 Documentation of the participant's
consent may be accomplished in one of two ways: a written consent
may be secured which embodies all of the aforementioned elements. 248 Sample copies of such written consent must be kept with
the committee records. 249 Oral consent may be obtained from the
subject or his legally authorized representative, provided written summaries of what is said to the subject are approved by the committee. 250 A short-form written consent must be signed by the subject or
his legal representative and by an auditor-witness documenting that
the basic elements of informed consent have been presented.251 - To
permit modification of the written or oral consent procedures, the
committee must establish that the risk to the subject is minimal, that
the use of the prescribed oral or written consent procedures would invalidate objectives of considerable importance, and that alternative
means of securing consent would be less advantageous to the subject.2 52 A grave omission in the regulations is their failure to explain
how nonprofessional members of the review committee shall make
a judgment about whether the risk to a subject is minimal or whether
experimental objectives will be invalidated. Scientific judgments by
persons unfamiliar with scientific disciplines may pose the possibility
of greater harm to -the experimental subject than judgments made
by ethically oriented investigators.
Whether oral or written, the consent may not contain any exculpatory language through which the subject is made to waive or appear to waive any of his legal rights. Any attempted release of the
2 53
Unorganization or its agents from negligence is -also prohibited.
expected consequences may result from this portion of the regulations. General assurances submitted to HEW must be signed by an
individual authorized to act and assume the obligations of the regula247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 46.3(c)(i)-(6).
§ 46.10(a).
§ 46.10(b).
§ 46.10(c).
§ 46.9.
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tions; 254 special assurances must be signed by each individual member of the institutional Teview committee. 255 Yet, in return for their
signed assurances, these individuals are not given the reciprocal assurance of their immunity from liability even for judgments made
in good faith. The regulations thus could make committee members
vulnerable to a variety of legal actions.
Dr. Chalkley suggests that physicians who serve on the organizational review committee will be protected by their professional malpractice insurance in much the same manner they are protected when
serving on professional standards review organizations. 256 Many
states have passed immunity statutes specifically protecting physicians from liability in the exercise of their duties on these professional standards review groups. 2 57 Such statutes have been. said
to codify the legally recognized privilege that permits physicians in
reviewing the work of colleagues to make remarks that in another
context might be considered defamatory. 2 58 Attorneys and ministers, he believes, can also be protected by their professional liability
coverage. 25 9 Nowhere, however, is the question of protection of the
citizen representative addressed realistically. He has neither the umbrella of professional liability insurance nor statutory immunity. The
comments to the regulations suggest that the applicant organiza2 60
tion's liability insurance will cover these lay persons so exposed,
but not all institutions have such coverage. Further contradiction
arises in the specific statement that the committee must not be com261
posed entirely of persons who are employees of the organization.
The comments suggest that such persons should be considered "employees" for the purpose of coverage. 2 62 Do the citizen or lay mem254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. § 46.4(b).
Id. § 46.7(a).
Telephone Interview, supra note 242.
B.J. Anderson, Legal Considerationsand Peer Review, in 1 PEER REvinw MANuAL 3 (1971), published and distributed by the American Medical
Association, Division of Medical Practice, Department of Insurance on Practice Management.
258. These statutes protect physicians from liability for remarks made about
other physicians in fulfilling the function of the review committees, which are
supposed to improve the quality of medical care. Individuals who provide information to review committees are also protected when communications are
published in good faith without malice. Id.
259. Telephone Interview, supranote 242.
260. Protection of Human Subjects, Comment D, 39 Fed. Reg. 18914,
18915 (1974).
261. 45 C.F.R § 46.6(b)(4) (1974).
262. Protection of Human Subjects, Comment D, 39 Fed. Reg. 18914,
18915 (1974).
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bers then become "employees" only for purposes of coverage? The
willingness of insurers to cover persons of such uncertain legal relationship to the insured is difficult to imagine.
For material failure to comply with these complex regulations,
the HEW Secretary may exercise his judgment and terminate
a grant or contract or suspend it.2 1 3 In evaluating present and future
proposals from the applicant, the regulations empower the Secretary
to consider whether the applicant has been subject to termination,
whether deficiencies have existed in the past, and whether corrective
steps have been taken. 264 The Secretary is given further authority
to impose additional conditions prior to awarding a grant. 26 5 Thus,
the power of the Secretary alone to terminate and his authority to
impose further conditions seem to subvert the very purpose of the
regulations. Ironically, the regulations permit the free exercise of
the subjective judgment of the Secretary while purporting to eliminate the subjective judgment of the scientist by involving the laity
in the process of scientific research. No such safeguards for the investigator are written into the regulations to protect him against the
vagaries or caprices of a Secretary who may reflect the attitudes of
266
an administration hostile to science.
1. Lay Representation v. Peer Review
The gravity of the penalties proposed in the HEW regulations
for the protection of human subjects forebodes a difficult time of adjustment both for medical researchers and ultimately, the public. In
a sense, the regulations taint the climate of investigation by raising
suspicion and distrust of the scientist. Not only is the assessment
of the subject's comprehension of the experiment and his consent to
it passed beyond the physician, but also beyond the scope of existing
legal principles on consent. The regulations, thus, reflect the current
ground swell for the involvement of the laity in medical ethics.
Whether the lay public is able to grapple more effectively with the
complex moral and scientific judgments about human experimentation is questionable.
263. 45 C.F.R. § 46.21(a) (1974).
264. Id. § 46.21(b).
265. Id. § 46.22.

266. See the legislative history of the National Research Service Award Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 103, 88 Stat. 342, for a description of administrative hostility to scientific research. S. REP. No. 93-960, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
2163-66 (1974).
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A.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

The Influence of the Tuskegee Panel

Even before the issuance of regulations for the protection of
human subjects, faith in the laity had been exemplified in the HEW's
appointment of the Ad Hoe Panel to investigate the Tuskegee experience after its details were made public. 207 Although the Panel included doctors, other professionals-lawyers, ministers, labor leaders,
educators, and health administrators-also served. 2 68 The Panel,
comparable to a blue-ribbon jury, concluded that the Tuskegee study
lacked the statistical validity and reliability necessary for a long term
2 69
investigation, and had an experimental goal of questionable value.
Thus, scientific and statistical judgments were made by individuals
whose training was not in these areas. Were the observations of the
Panel made more perceptive by the presence of laymen? Were their
judgments different from those that a panel composed of doctors
alone might have reached? The works of Doctors Welt, Beecher,
2 70
and Lasagna, for example, would seem to belie such a conclusion.
What is striking is that the Panel did not say that the experiment
was begun over 40 years ago, was probably maintained through
bureaucratic oversight, and would probably be impossible today.
The Panel's report purports to be a blueprint for assuring that Public
Health Service grants are conditioned upon complete attention to
ethics. 27 1 The Panel, it seems, did not take cognizance of what had
been going on down the hall at the NIH since 1953, when guidelines
27 2
for the protection of the individual were first issued.
Aside from specific recommendations to indemnify the Tuskegee
subjects, 2 73 the Panel's major suggestion was the promulgation of a

267. Curran, The Tuskegee Syphillis Study, 289 NEw ENG. J. Mat. 730
(1973).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. E.g., L. LASAGNA, THE DocTORs' Dmammss (1962); Beecher, Ethics
and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. Man. 1354 (1966); Welt, Reflections
on the Problems of Human Experimentation, 25 CONN. MEn. 75 (1961).
271. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, FINAL REPORT oF
THE TUSKEGEE STUY AD Hoc ADVISORY PANEL (1973).
272. Frankel, supra note 245, at 10.

273. Dr. Irving Ladimer has been a strong advocate of such monetary protection. E.g., Ladimer, Social Responsibility.in Clinical Investigation, 18 MED-

ICAL SCIENCE 32, 39 (1967). Further, United States Army research is covered
by the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Army Reg. No. 70-25 (Use of Volunteers as Subjects of Research) (1962).
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statute which would empanel a permanent body to regulate all HEW
research and possibly all research, whether publicly or privately supported. 27 4 The Panel suggested a superstructure, fashioned after our
court system, with separate peer and lay review groups from whose
decisions the right of appeal is granted to higher authorities. 27 5 The
Panel has even recommended that the decisions of these groups be
published in learned journals. 276 In this writer's view, any proposed
274. Curran, supra note 267, at 734.
275. Precisely these types of suggestions may be found in the work of several social scientists, see, e.g., note 276 infra. Bernard Barber, a social scientist at Barnard College, views physicians as "men of power" who possess mediocre ethics." See Barber, Some "New Men of Power": The Case of Biomedical Reaearch Scientists, 169 ANNALS OF N.Y. AcA). ScI. 51 (1970). To
the knowledge of this author, Professor Barber has not commented upon the
ethics of social scientists.
276. Curran, supra note 267, at 734. The work of the Panel echoes the
type of thinking expressed by social scientists who have lately entered the discussion about human experimentation. See B. BARBER, J. LALLY, J. MAxARusHKA & D. SULLIVAN, RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJEcrS: PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL
CONTROL IN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION (1973). Barber et al. state that their
work is the first attempt to obtain systematic empirical estimates on expressed
ethical standards compared with actual behavioral practices. Id. at 5. The
Barber study quite literally suggests that an appeals system is required to maintain "control" over physicians. The conclusion of the group is that a new profession should be created-that of the "informed outsider," i.e., a retired doctor
or nurse or perhaps a social scientist who would have the ability to judge the
ethical merits of proposed experimentation. Id. at 197. The basic flaw in this
proposal is that the informed outsider cannot remain the impartial evaluator
once he becomes part of an institution. In addition to exhibiting an unseemly,
strong, and perplexing hostility to doctors and little faith in attorneys, the book
demonstrates an unclear understanding and many misconceptions about the
conduct of medical research. For example, the test constructed by the group
includes in the definition of clinical research the concept of the patient's being
"at risk" when the collection of human substances-presumably blood or excreta-is undertaken. Physicians and institutions were asked to "agree or disagree" on a series of premises, many of which were framed in the "fallacy of
the complex question," "Have you stopped beating your wife?" For a discussion of this well recognized principle of faulty logic see BARKER, ELEMENTS
OF LOGIC 178-79 (1965). Many of the conclusions were based upon an "interview" study of two institutions receiving Public Health Service grants, when
by the authors' count in 1969, 1600 institutions in the United States were receiving such Public Health Service money. Id. at 12.
No a priori reason exists, as the authors suggest, for believing that the addition of individuals not a part of the research institution would improve the
effectiveness of a local research review committee. Lay participation by patients, as suggested id. at 194-95, demonstrates an insensitivity to the emotional fragility of persons during any illness.
An example of the hostility toward physicians which pervades the work is
in the discussion of the abuse of power that knowledge gives. Here the reader
is free to infer that knowledge gained by physicians is withheld from patient
and community in order to preserve the doctors' power. Id. at 186.
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procedure involving human subjects -that occasions such a difference
of opinion that appeal to a higher authority is required should probably not be conducted at all.
Further difficulty with recommendations like those of the Tuskegee Panel is that they are soon echoed by others.2 7 7 Ideas rise and
fall in fashion like modes in clothing. The hard reality is that decisions about human experimentation are difficult. Perhaps their
difficulty has made onlookers impatient.

Finally, the major difficulty with the thinking advanced by the
Tuskegee Panel and with the new NIH regulations discussed earlier
is the abolition of .that flexibility which is critical to making an ethical
judgment. Sometimes, in Hippocrates' words, the occasion is fleeting; 278 a patient's illness may require an unanticipated immediate

experimental deviation from accepted practice. The sweep of NIH
guidelines from 1953 up until the present codification demonstrates
how accommodations can be made to the exigencies of experimentation as they arise.279 Such flexibility becomes impossible when
ethics become entrapped in statute.
B.

Legislation

The risk of rigidity did not discourage the 93d Congress, which
passed the National Research Service Award Act after the introduction and consideration of a lengthy list of bills dealing with human
experimentation. 28 0 The Act is a consolidation of bills dealing with
277. The legislative history of the National Research Service Award Act
makes clear that the report of the Panel was highly influential. S. REP. No.
93-960, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2174 (1974).
278. 4 HnpocRA-ns, WoRKs, Aphorisms § 1 (W. Jones transl., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1927).
279. Frankel, supra note 245, at 5-30.
280. The list of bills introduced in both Houses during the 93d Congress
is impressive.
The bills introduced in the House covered a number of areas in the experimentation area. In H.R. 10403, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), Protection of Human Subjects Act, the proposal to establish an 11-man commission to regulate projects supported by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
particularly reflects the growing interest in lay review. H.R. 9341, 93d Cong.
2d Sess. (1974), was a proposed amendment to the Public Health Service Act
to provide for a new program to support the training of public and community
health personnel and to raise the programs of assistance under Title VII of
that Act. H.R. 11539, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), was a bill to improve the
Public Health and National Health Service Corps scholarship training program.
H.R. 11339, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), proposed to amend the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act by requiring that patients not be treated with investigational new drugs without their consent.
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the ethical, social, legal, and moral implications of advances in biomedical and behavioral research and the funding of grants for the
training of medical scientists and other health professionals.

Through the legislative process, the training of future investigatorsyoung doctors and Ph.D candidates-has become inextricably bound
with cumbersome bureaucratic proposals for insuring ethical experi281
mentation.
In brief, Title I of the National Research Service Award Act of
Three Senate bills particularly emphasized lay review. First, S. 878, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), "To amend the Public Health Service Act to provide
for restrictions on funds for experimental use," provided for an organizational
committee composed of individuals of varying backgrounds to review federally
funded projects involving human subjects "at risk." The organizational committee was to determine if subject's rights were protected and to insure that
risks did not outweigh benefits anticipated. Informed consent was carefully
detailed, including provisions designed to produce full disclosure of experimental procedures, risks, and alternatives. The subject was expressly to be
given the right to withdraw at any time. Documentation of consent was provided for, and exculpatory language was banned. Like existing FDA and Public Health Service requirements, S. 878 provided an exception to consent requirements when it was not feasible to obtain consent.
Second, S. 974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), offered by Senator Jacob
Javits, was designed to amend the Public Health Service Act in order to increase emphasis on ethical, social, legal, and moral implications of research.
Third, S.J. Res. 71, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), a joint resolution, was to
provide for study and evaluation of the ethical, social, and legal implications
of advances in biomedical research. A commission was to be composed of
individuals drawn from medicine, law, theology, physical, social, and biological
sciences, philosophy, humanities, health administration, and government. The
commission was to make a complete analysis of scientific advances, their implications, and the codes, laws, and principles relating to the area. In addition
consideration was to be given to the public's understanding of these issues.
A number of other bills were also introduced in the Senate. S. 934, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), was to create a National Human Experimentation
Standards Board composed of persons selected from disciplines concerned with
clinical investigation. The Board would have created guidelines for ethical research and reviewed experiments to enforce compliance with the guidelines.
S. 2071, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), dealt with training grants to enable young
physicians to become medical scientists. S. 2368, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
was aimed at requiring informed consent for testing medical devices. S. 2072,
93d .Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), suggested a National Commission on the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to set up rules
for ethical research, procedures for review boards, and rates for compensating
injured subjects.
A consolidation of S.J. Res. 71, S. 2071, S. 2072, and H. 9341 produced
S. 724, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), that combined provision of training grants
to young doctors with bureaucratic proposals designed to insure ethical research.
281. Culliton, Training Grants; Tied Up in Congress with Ethics Bills, 182
SCmENCE 265 (1973).
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1974 provides support for predoctoral and postdoctoral training in
biomedical and behavioral research by amending the Public Health
Service Act to provide National Research Service awards. 28 2 In return for 3 years of financial support, a recipient of an award has
a number of options for service. He may serve for a specified period
by engaging in health research or -teaching,by serving in -the National
Health Service Corps, by practicing his medical specialty in an area
283
of shortage, or by working for a health maintenance organization.
The Act's legislative history states that Title I "was prepared in
response to [a] drastic change in National policy proposed by the
[Nixon] administration with regard to the support of training for the
nation's biomedical researchers. It arose out of the conviction that
the proposed changes would significantly change this nation's biomedical research activities, activities which are currently preeminent
284
in the world."
If Title I was enacted in opposition 'to the administration's proposed policy changes regarding the training of young doctors, Title
H was enacted in response to a recital of carefully selected horror
tales of which the Tuskegee study was one. At no time during the
Senate hearings dealing with the ethical, moral, social, and legal
dilemmas of medical advances was testimony given detailing the active and ongoing protection of human subjects by conscientious
physicians and biomedical researchers. No evidence was offered
about researchers' evergrowing sensitivity -to the problems of human
research. 285 Instead, having listened to several days of testimony
about lapses in ethics, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
could only conclude, as it did, that in too many cases the subjects
of biomedical and behavioral research were inadequately protected.
The consensus that legislation was needed "with no 'ifs' and 'ands'
and 'buts' "286 reflected, with somewhat lesser intensity, the generally hostile attitude toward medical research exhibited by the administration.
The Act establishes a National Advisory Council for the Protec282. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348,
tit. I, § 103, 88 Stat. 342 [hereinafter cited as NRSAA].
283. Id. § 103(c) (1)(C) (2).
284. S. REP. No. 381, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1974).
285. E.g., id. at 12-19. See also Hearings on S. 974, S.878, and S.J. Res.
71 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare (Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation,1973), 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pts. 1-3 (1973).
286. S.REP. No. 381, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1974).
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tion of Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The membership consists of the Secretary of HEW and no less than seven nor
more than fifteen distinguished individuals in the fields of medicine,
law, ethics, the biological, physical, and social sciences, philosophy,
humanities, health administration, government, and public affairs
who are to serve for a period of 4 years beginning July 1, 1976.287
Displaying the now familiar infatuation with the laity, the Act provides that no more than three individuals may be persons who have
engaged in biomedical and behavioral research. 288 The Council's
duty is to advise the Secretary concerning the protection of human
subjects, reviewing the policies, regulations, and other requirements
of the Secretary governing research to determine whether basic
ethical principles are being observed. 28 9 It must also determine the
effectiveness of these regulations and -make recommendations for revisions, if needed, and periodically review changes, scope, purpose,
and -type of research and the impact of these changes upon the poli2 90
cies, regulations, and other requirements of the Secretary.
One of the most important aspects of the Act is the establishment
of a National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research to serve until the Council is
seated in 1976.291 The Commission, which has now been selected
by the Secretary of HEW, is composed of distinguished individuals
in medicine, law, ethics, theology, the biological, physical, and social
sciences, philosophy, the humanities, health administration, government, and public affairs. 292 Once again, reflecting a generalized distrust of the scientist, the Act provides that only five of the eleven
members may be research scientists. 29 3 On August 23, 1974, the
Secretary of HEW announced his approval of the charter providing
for the operation and functioning of the Commission and directed, in
accordance with the Act's provisions, that the Commission shall cease
287. NRSAA tit. II, pt. B, § 211, 88 Stat. 342.
288. Id.§ 211(a).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. NRSAA tit. II, pt. A, § 201, 88 Stat. 342.
292. Id. The Secretary has now appointed the Commission. It is composed of a professor of behavioral research, a university vice chancellor for
health sciences, the president of a national Negro women's group, a professor
of bioethics, three professors of law, a professor of Christian ethics, a gynecologist-obstetrician, a professor of internal medicine, a pediatrician, and a professor of physiological psychology. Ethics Commission Named, 186 SCIENCE 38
(1974).
293. NRSAA fit. II, pt. A, § 201(b)(1), 88 Stat. 342.
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to exist 30 days following the submission of its final report, which
will be due sometime in 1976.294
The Commission's major function is to conduct a comprehensive
investigation to identify the basic ethical principles which should underlie the conduct of experimentation.2 9 5 It must develop guidelines
to assure that these ethical principles are met and recommend appropriate administrative action to apply these guidelines to HEW supported research. In carrying out these tasks, the Commission must
discern the boundaries between biomedical and behavioral research
and the accepted routine practice of medicine. It must consider
appropriate guidelines for the selection of human experimental subjects and the nature and definition of informed consent.2 96 The
Commission must consider ways -to evaluate -and monitor performance by the Institutional Review Boards and the methods for carrying out the Boards' decisions. 297 Through the mechanism of these
Institutional Review Boards, Title II, dealing with the protection of
human subjects, is closely tied to Title I, providing support for trainees in biomedical and behavioral research. Section 212 amends the
Public Health Service Act by requiring that each entity applying for
a training grant provide assurance to the Secretary that an Institutional Review Board has been established to review the research at
the institution and to protect the human subjects thereof.29 8 Further
concern for ethics may be found in the Commission's obligation under the Act to study the appropriateness of applying its guidelines
to the delivery of health care to patients under HEW supported programs and to consider the protection of subjects in research efforts
not under the regulation of the Secretary of HEW.299 The Commission is also directed to study the requirement for informed consent
to participation in research involving children, prisoners, and the institutionalized mentally infirm. 300
A further monumental task assigned to the Commission embraces
an analysis of the scientific and technological advances in past, present, and projected biomedical and behavioral research, and the implication of those advances for individuals and society. Pursuant to
294. 39 Fed. Reg. 32172 (1974).
295. NRSAA tit. 1, pt. A, § 202(a) (1) (A), 88 Stat. 342.
296. Id. § 202(a)(1)(B).
297. Id. § 202(a)(1)(B)(ii). The phenomenon of the Institutional Review Board first appeared in the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 284
(c), 287c(b)(c), 288c(c)(f) (1944).
298. NRSAA tit. II, pt B, § 212, 88 Stat. 342.
299. Id. pt. A, §§ 202(a)(1)(C).
300. Id. § 202(a)(2).
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this duty, it must analyze the laws and moral and ethical principles
governing the use of technology in medical practice and the public
30
understanding of such laws. '
Fetal research, one of the most controversial branches of medical
research, is dealt with in two parts of the Act. The Commission
is directed to study the nature and extent of fetal research and,
within 4 months after all Commission members have taken office,
to recommend policies to the Secretary defining -the circumstances
under which such research should be undertaken. 30 2 During this
period, the Act also prohibits HEW support of research on a living
human fetus before or after induced abortion unless the research is
done for the purpose of assuring the survival of the fetus.3 0 3 Pursuant -to this statutory limitation HEW instructed all its agencies to
discontinue fetal research until the Secretary determines the mora304
torium should be lifted.
Another section of the Act treats the critical issue of psychosurgery, directing the Commission to study the use of psychosurgery
for the 5-year period ending in 1972 to determine the appropriateness and need for its use and to recommend to the Secretary under
what circumstances it should be performed. 80 5 Hopefully, the Commission may be able to provide some guidance in this troublesome
area.
Finally, the most important part of the Act lies in a short section
dealing with the duties of the Secretary. Despite the elaborate
mechanism for study, analysis, advice, and ethical guidance to be
supplied by the distinguished Commission, ultimate authority for the
future of American research is placed in the hands of the Secretary,
who is empowered to determine whether the actions proposed by the
Commission are appropriate to assure the protection of human subjects. If he concludes that the suggested action is inappropriate, he
has merely to publish his determination in the Federal Register with
a statement of the reasons for his decision.3 0 6 Like the NIH regulations, then, the Act places the ultimate moral judgment with the
Secretary, with no assurance that his judgments will be "more moral"
than those of physicians consulting together. The Act creates the
301. Id. § 203.
302. Id.§ 202(b).
303. Id.pt. B, § 213.

304. Letter from Charles C. Edwards, Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, to the Editor, 185 SCIENCE 900 (1974).
305. NRSAA tit. H, pt. A, § 202(c), 88 Stat. 342.
306. Id.§ 205.
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same kind of imbalance that exists in the NIH regulations; laymen
are included in the Commission to protect subjects from arbitrary
researchers, but nothing is done to assure that researchers are protected from arbitrary decisions of the Secretary.
C.

ADDITIONAL PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR THE

PROTECTION OF SPECIAL SUBJECTS

Earlier, this article pointed out -the difficulties of working with
subjects who suffer a legal disability which necessitates special solicitude for their care. 30 7 Responding in part to their needs, a companion set of regulations30 8 to the now effective regulations for the
Protection of Human Subjects was proposed.30 9 The proposed regulations purport to afford additional protection to special subjectsfetuses, abortuses, prisoners, and the mentally disabled.310 Issuance
of rules for the protection of children has been delayed. 3 11
The proposed regulations dealing with these subjects, for whom
emotions run so high, acknowledge the enactment of the National
Research Service Award Act and express the hope that the proposed
rules will continue the current public dialogue and that the rules will
be available to the Commission in its discussions.3 12 Characterization of the reaction to the regulations as "dialogue" is a pallid description of the controversy they engendered. Five hundred responses
were received about the original version of Protection of Human
Subjects. 31 3 Four hundred and fifty responses were received about
the first offered regulations on special subjects. Perhaps as a result
of this tumultuous reception, both the enacted regulations and the
proposed regulations for special subjects are a considerable retreat
from the original posture of HEW. 314 Nevertheless, exemplifying
the force of an idea whose time has come, the proposed regulations
on special subjects not only interpose the laity between the researcher
307. See text accompanying notes 91-173 supra.
308. Proposed HEW Reg. §§ 46.301-.310, .401-.407, .501-.507, .601..607,

39 Fed. Reg. 30648 (1974).
309. 45 C.F.R. § 46.1-.22 (1974).
310. Proposed HEW Reg. §§ 46.301-.310, .401-.407, .501-.507, 39 Fed.
Reg. 30648 (1974).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.

314. See 38 Fed. Reg. 27882, Protection of Human Subjects: Proposed Policy (1973) (the first set of proposed regulations); 38 Fed. Reg. 31738, Protection of Human Medical Subjects (1973) (a second draft of proposed regulations).
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and his subject, they also require the formation of a Consent Committee,3 15 adding another level of surveillance to the organizational
review committee of the basic regulations3 16 and to the Institutional
3 17
Review Boards of the Public Health Service Act.
Applications to HEW for support of research dealing with
fetuses, abortuses, prisoners, and the institutionalized mentally disabled must be reviewed by a fourth group, an Ethical Advisory
Board established within the NIH to advise the funding agency about
the acceptability of such activities from an ethical view. Members
of this Board shall be competent -to deal with medical, legal, social,
and ethical issues and shall include physicians, research scientists,
lawyers, clergymen, and ethicians as well as members of the general
3 18
public.
In addition to the guidance of the Ethical Advisory Board, serving
at a national level, and the organizational review committee serving
at the institutional level, the regulations require the establishment of
a Consent Committee, which will be even more deeply involved in
the research activity. Specifically the Consent Committee must:
1) participate in the actual selection of subjects and the
securing of consent to assure that legally effective consent is secured. Depending upon the activity involved,
this duty could require approval of an individual's
participation or simple verification of the procedures
used in -theselection process.
2) monitor the progress of the activity according to the
requirements of the Secretary. This supervision could
include visits to the activity site, identification of
members who might be available for consultation with
those involved in the consent procedures, continuing
evaluation of the activity to determine if unanticipated risks have arisen, periodic contact with participants to ascertan their continued willingness to
remain in the activity, and the authority to terminate
participation with or without the consent of the
319
participant.
The size and composition of the Consent Committee must be approved by the Secretary, who is also authorized to determine the adequacy of the committee, considering the scope and nature of the acti315. Proposed HEW Reg. §§ 46.305, .405, .506, 39 Fed. Reg. 3053, 3055,

3056 (1974).
316. 45 C.F.R. § 46.4(b) (1974).
317. NRSAA tit. II, pt. B, § 212, 88 Stat. 342.
318. Proposed HEW Reg. § 46.304, 39 Fed. Reg. 30653 (1974).
319. Id. § 46.305.
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vity it will oversee and the particular subjects with whom it shall
be involved.3 20 The Secretary shall determine if the committee is
objective, if it has sufficient members not involved in research and
development, and if it is competent to deal with the legal, moral,
social, and ethical issues involved.8 2 '
1.

ResearchInvolving Fetuses and Abortuses

One of the first assignments reserved by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research is the study of the nature, extent, and purposes of
fetal research and the consideration of alternatives. 3 22 The moratorium on fetal research declared by the Secretary as a consequence
of the strictures of the National Research Act3 23 places the proposed
special-subjects regulations dealing with the fetus and abortus in
limbo. Perhaps the cooling-off period will be helpful in an area full
of bitter disputes, conflicting moral values, and lack of understanding.
In the proposed special-subjects regulations a fetus is defined as
a product of conception from the time of implantation to the time
of delivery.3 2- An abortus is defined as a fetus which is expelled
whole prior to viability, whether spontaneously or as the result of
surgical or medical intervention. 325 The term does not apply to the
placenta, cells, tissues, or organs excised from a dead fetus. 326 No
activity involving fetuses in utero or pregnant women may be undertaken unless the activity is for the purpose of benefitting the health
needs of the fetus or its mother, or the activity, conducted as part
of a precedure to terminate a pregnancy, is for the purpose of improving prenatal diagnosis, preventing premature birth, or studying
32 7
and preventing birth defects or injury.
Additionally, the proposed regulations provide that fetal research
3 28
may not proceed without the consent of legally competent parents.
The father's consent is excused if he is not identifiable or available
or if the purpose of the activity is ,to respond to the mother's health
320. Id. § 46.305(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 30653.
321. Id.

322. NRSAA tit. 1I, pt A, § 202(b), 88 Stat. 342.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. § 213.
Proposed HEW Reg. § 46.303 (d), 39 Fed. Reg. 30653 (1974).
Id. § 46.303(f), 39 Fed. Reg. 30653.

Id.
Id. § 46.306(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654.
Id. § 46.306(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654.
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needs.3 29 Once again, the regulations are inconsistent. The United
States Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade330 that a woman has an
absolute right to abortion in her first trimester and a conditional right
to it beyond that interval. Since the regulations insist upon her consent, it seems illogical to deny her the incontrovertible right to say
what shall be done with her fetus. ,Indeed, some attorneys have
likened the fetus to any other portion of her body that she may
3 31
donate to science.
In general, the regulations applicable to fetuses are applicable
to abortuses, but additionally .they state that the vital functions of
the abortus may not be artifically maintained except where the purpose is to develop new methods for helping abortuses to survive. 332
2. PrisonerResearch
A prisoner is defined in the proposed xegulations as any individual involuntarily confined in a penal institution under a criminal or
civil statute or any individual confined to any other type of institution which provides alternatives in incarceration in a penal institu3 33

tion.

In addition to the duties prescribed for the organizational review
committee by the already enacted regulations, 334 the proposed regulations require the organizational review committee to determine that
no undue inducement is offered to prisoners, taking into account
their earnings, living conditions, medical care, food, and the
amenities offered to the participants that would be better than
those generally available to prisoners.3 35 The committee must
also determine whether all aspects of the activity would be acceptable if the subjects were not prisoners or whether the activity
involves a negligible risk to the subjects and is for the purpose of
studying the effects of incarceration. 3 36 The review committee must
decide whether the application for funds contains adequate procedures for the selection of subjects and for securing consents and
monitoring the activity. 33 7 It must also determine that the rates of
329. Id.
330. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

331. Goldston, Fetal Research in the Balance, 4 MAX.PRACrIcE X-POSURE
REPoRTS 4 (1974).
332. Proposed HEW Reg. § 46.307(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974).
333. Id. § 46.403(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654.
334. 45 C.F.R. § 46.6 (1974).
335. Proposed HEW Reg. § 46.404(a)(1), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974).
336. Id. § 46.404(a)(2), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654.
337. Id. § 46.404(a)(3), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654.
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remuneration are consistent with the activity but not in excess of that
generally available to inmates of the penal institution and that withdrawal from the project for medical reasons will not result in a punitive loss of anticipated income. 3 8
A Consent Committee also must be -established for prisoner research; significantly, it must include a prisoner or a representative
of a prisoner's organization in its membership. 339 Special restrictions
are placed upon persons detained in a correctional facility pending
arraignment, trial, or sentencing or those in a hospital for observation
prior to arraignment, trial, or sentencing.3 40
3. Research Involving the InstitutionalizedMentally Disabled
The term "mentally disabled" includes the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, the emotionally disturbed, and the senile. 341 The
stated purpose of the proposed regulations on the institutionalized
mentally disabled is to provide additional safeguards where the freedom and rights of the subjects are potentially subject to limitation
and the subjects may be unable to comprehend sufficient information
or be legally incompetent to give informed consent to their participation.

3

42

The term "institutionalized" includes persons confined voluntarily
or involuntarily in a residential institution for the care of the mentally disabled.3 43 The definition includes public and private hospitals, community mental health centers, halfway houses, nursing
homes, and general hospitals where the mentally disabled are pa3

tients.

44

The most important aspect of these proposed Tegulations is the
provision limiting research using such individuals to the etiology,
pathogenesis, prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of mental disability
or the management, training, or rehabilitation of the mentally disc
abled.3 45 The research must also seek information which cannot be
obtained from those not institutionalized and mentally disabled. 34 6
The organizational review committee must ascertain that the general
338. id. § 46.404(a)(4), 39 Fed. Reg. 30655.
339. Id. § 46.405(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 30655.

340. Id. § 46.406, 39 Fed. Reg. 30655.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§

46.503(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 30655.
46.502, 39 Fed. Reg. 30655.
46.503(c), 39 Fed. Reg. 30655.
46.503(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 30655.

345. Id. § 46.504(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 30655.
346. Id.
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requirements of the regulations are met and that no undue inducements will be offered other than those generally available to the
847
mentally disabled at the institution.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article posed the question whether the Tuskegee experiment
could be conducted today. The increasing intensity of concern about
human experimentation exhibited in scientific and legal disciplines
makes the possibility seem remote. No formula, however, can guarantee that decisions that appear proper today will remain morally
correct in future decades. The only certainty is that attitudes will
change, but decisions about human experimentation will remain as
difficult as they have always been for the scientific investigator and
his peers who shared the decisionmaking process. Past errors in
judgment by physicians have created an understandable desire
among those on the outside looking in for some kind of controlparticularly because a major source of funding has been the tax dollar.
Unfortunately, the seductive but erroneous impression has arisen
that what has been lacking has been the folk wisdom and democratizing influence of the laity. The current regard for the importance
of lay opinion is exemplified by the proliferating array of statutes
and regulations seeking -to involve lay persons in scientific decisions.3 4 8 Yet lay thinking on such matters appears to have added
little to the moral rectitude sought. Some examples of the dangerous
consequences of lay meddling may be useful.
Both the National Research Service Award Act and the proposed
regulations for the protection of special subjects ban all research on
abortuses and fetuses unless it is related to fetal development or the
maintenance of fetal or maternal health.3 49 Strong evidence suggests
that the legislation was a response to lay opinion about fetal research.3 50 The regulations and statutes thus accommodate lay opin347. Id. § 46.505(a) (2), 39 Fed. Reg. 30656.
348. See, e.g., NRSAA tit. II, pt. A, § 202(b), 88 Stat. 342; Protection of
Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 18913 (1974), effective July 1, 1974; Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 30647 (1974) (a new set of proposed
regulations designed to give additional protections in biomedical research, development, and related activities involving fetuses, abortuses, pregnant women,
in vitro fertilization, prisoners, and the mentally disabled).
349. See, e.g., NSRAA tit. IT, pt. A, § 213, 88 Stat. 342; Proposed HEW
Reg. §§ 46.306-.309, 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974).
350. See, e.g., Goldston, supranote 331, at 3.
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ion but ignore scientific fact and human necessity. Fetuses are essential to medical research because fetal tissue is used for studying
poliomyelitis, measles, cancer, and cholera. 351 Under the Act, which
declares a moratorium on such research until the Commission issues
guidelines on fetal research,3 52 no work using fetal tissue can proceed
on those diseases. Yet the public clamors for cancer cures and correctly laments the death of children from measles.
In Boston, four physicians have been criminally indicted under
353
an old grave robbing statute because of their study of dead fetuses.
The doctors were engaging in much needed research to determine
the effect of two commonly used antibiotics which they were con3 54
sidering for use in the treatment of syphillis of -the fetus in utero.
They wanted to know whether a particular antibiotic was able to
cross the placental barrier to eliminate the syphillis organism in the
fetus.3 5 5 With the rising incidence of veneral disease in the United
States, the need for this information and possible mode of treatment
is critical. 356 The subjects of the experiments were women who were
scheduled to have legal abortions, their consents had been secured,
and the research procedure had been approved by the review com3
mittee of the hospital in which the investigation was to proceed. 5
Although the subjects had consented to participation in the part of
the experiment which affected them directly, they had not specifically "consented" to the study of the tissues of the fetus after the
abortion.35 8 In routine practice, the disposition of all surgical and
pathological specimens which are removed from patients is the
province of the hospital. Presumably the fetuses studied by the
Boston doctors would have been disposed of if they had not been
used for research. 359 Until recently, no one has suggested that consent be secured for such disposal, but today, under the pressure of
the informed consent regulations, hospitals are beginning to require
351. Id. at 4. See also Behrman, The Importance of Fetal Research, N.Y.
Times, June 9, 1974, § 4 at 17, col. 2.
352. NRSAA tit. II, pt. B, § 213, 88 Stat. 342.
353 Culliton, Grave Robbing: The Charge Against Four from Boston City
Hospital, 186 ScIENcE 420 (1974). On February 15, 1975, one of the physicians, Dr. Kenneth Edelin, was found guilty of manslaughter. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 16, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
354. Culliton, supra note 353, at 421.
355. Id.
356. Venereal Disease Remains Major Health Problem, 221 J.A.M.A. 14
(1972).
357. Culliton, supra note 353, at 421.
358. Id. at 420.
359. Id.
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consent from patients to use their sweat, urine, and feces in the vital
biological materials banks in which substances are stored to be available for experimental purposes.3 6 0
The regulations on abortuses portend even stranger consequences
since they state that the vital functions of the abortus may not be
artificially maintained except where the purpose is to develop new
methods for helping abortuses to survive.3 61 Incongruously, then,
this regulation would permit a woman to have an abortion at the
same time permitting the physician to keep the abortus alive outside
her body.
When the pioneer discussants of the moral issues in human experimentation began to marshal instances of poor judgment, 3 62 their purpose was to raise the consciousness of physicians to the possibility
of abuse. Clearly their purpose was not to raise the surrealistic
bureaucracy which has resulted from -the National Research Service
Award Act and the HEW regulations. In fact, the efforts of doctors
like Welt, Beecher, Lasagna, and Shannon increased medical scientists' sensitivity to the problem and fostered for their profession
a revolutionary concept-peer review364--which was unknown to
other disciplines and which has proven a powerful force for good.
Little reason exists to believe that other disciplines have added significantly to the ethical basis laid down by physicians.
The danger of the present regulations and statute is that they
will inhibit scientific investigation, and a dead and stale science will
ensue in which "obedience .to artifical precepts takes precedence over
rational assessment."'3 6 4 Scientists will be "bombarded by criticisms,
suits and penalties." 36 5 Such a time did indeed exist in the dark
medieval period of the history of medicine when the dicta of Galen,
a physician of ancient times, were venerated by the laity and new
practices and procedures were abhorred. 366 Because of Galen's dic360. E.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1974, at 35, col. 1.
361. Proposed HEW Reg. § 46.307, 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974).
362. E.g., L. LASAGNA, THE, DocToRs' DILEMMA (1962); Beecher, Ethics
and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966); Welt, Reflections
on the Problems of Human Experimentation, 25 CoNN. MED. 75 (1961).
363. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
364. DeBakey, Medical Research and the Golden Rule, 203 J.A.M.A. 574,
576 (1968).
365. Moore, Therapeutic Innovation: Ethical Boundaries in the Initial
Clinical Trials of New Drugs and Surgical Procedures, 98 DAEDELUS 502, 521
(1969).
366. F. GARRISON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 143
(4th ed. 1929).
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turn that "surgery is only a mode of treatment" and therefore, by
implication, not worthy of study by reputable physicians, surgery was
367
left in part in those days to the unskilled and the charlatan.
Those surgeons who were skilled advised their colleagues to avoid
operative treatment of difficult or incurable cases.3 68 "[W]hen they
attempted the major operations, their custom was to require a written
guarantee that no harm should come to them in the event of a fatal
termination." 36 9 A similar release from liability is neither available
nor desired by present-day investigators. Nevertheless, physicians
may be forced into inactivity by the apprehension which the present
legislation engenders.
Too often history has proved lay judgments about scientific matters not only incorrect but damaging ultimately to mankind. Two
physicians recalled recently the vilification of Galileo, who dared to
espouse the concept of a universe in which the earth was not the
center, and the trial of a Tennessee schoolteacher, who taught his
classes that man had evolved from lower forms of life. 370 Czapek
and Dykes state correctly, "No matter how strongly any group of
citizens may cleave to a certain belief on moral grounds that belief
'371
may ultimately prove false."
No one need question that restraints are needed against the
scientist victimized by ambition, inexperience, or insensitivity to perform dangerous experiments. But who is in the better position to
judge those factors than his fellow scientists?
Policing medical experimentation, preferably before it is carried
out, is without doubt a necessity. The question remains how 'this
is to be done-by those who are intimately knowledgeable about the
risks and gains or by those who stand on the outside and are governed by folk wisdom concerning morality and health needs. One
interesting example of this conflict may be found in the actions of
protesters against the Willowbrook experiment, who accused the investigators of performing vile experiments and at the same time with3 72
holding the benefits derived from those experiments.
367. Id. at 144.

368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Dykes & Czapek, Regulations and Legislation ConcerningAbortus Research, 229 J.A.M.A. 1303 (1974).
371. Id.
372. Gillmor, Wrestling With Ethical Dilemmas: How Much for the Patient, How Much for Medical Science? An Interview With Dr. Saul Krugman,
MODERN MEDICINE, San. 7, 1974, at 30,32.
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The unreasoned faith in the ability of the laity to make a reasoned judgment is the disturbing premise of contemporary thinking.
Lay opinion all too often supports the glamorous results of unverified experimentation. Thus, the danger inherent in the use of lay
opinion is twofold: through ignorance laymen may inhibit and stifle
justified high risk experiments and at the same time permit unjustifiably risky projects because of the glamor of the potential results.
The unthinking physician may avoid appropriate control studies because he believes to do so would withhold from his patients what
he conceives to be new and lifesaving procedures.
On the one hand, we hear a cry for improved delivery of health
care. People are encouraged, as they should be, to rely upon medical help from conception onward. They are encouraged to put their
faith in doctors. On -the other hand, the intrusion of lay opinion
into the rectitude of proposed research implies that physicians are,
in fact, not to be trusted. By some mysterious power the laity can
make a judgment that is better informed and more moral than that
provided by experts. This kind of conflict fosters a national schizophrenia about life-and-death matters which we can ill afford.

